Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 41
Issue 5 November 2008

Article 1

2008

Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private
Transborder Commercial Disputes in the Americas
Don Peters

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Don Peters, Can We Talk? Overcoming Barriers to Mediating Private Transborder Commercial Disputes in
the Americas, 41 Vanderbilt Law Review 1251 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol41/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL
of TRANSNATIONAL

VOLUME 41

LAW

NOVEMBER 2008

NUMBER 5

Can
We
Talk?
Overcoming
Barriers to Mediating Private
Transborder Commercial Disputes
in the Americas
Don Peters*

ABSTRACT

This Article examines cognitive and cultural barriers
creating the relatively infrequent use of mediation to resolve
private, transborder commercial disputes in the Americas. It
begins by analyzing the challenges presented by transborder
commercial litigation. It then presents and supports the claim
that international arbitration, the most frequently used
transbordercommercial dispute resolution method, suffers from
many of litigation's disadvantages including excessive expense
and delay, loss of outcome control, damaging or ending rather
than preserving and improving commercial relationships, and
using legalistic, rights-basedperspectives that obscure business
interest-basedsolutions.
This Article next examines several cognitive biases that
impair rational decision making regarding dispute resolution
method selection in transborder commercial disagreements.
Analyzing selective and partisan perception, egocentric and
optimistic overconfidence biases, and fixed pie and win-lose
assumptions, the Article integrates empirical research and
anecdotal data to support the claim that these cognitive biases
encourage arbitrationand discourage mediation. This Article
also analyzes ways that American business and legal culture
1251
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encourages cognitive biases, which leads disputants toward
adjudication and away from mediation, and how other cultural
differences generate misunderstandings that contribute to the
frequent choice to arbitrate rather than mediate private
transbordercommercial disputes.
This Article then suggests several strategiesfor overcoming
these cognitive and cultural biases and analyzes how these
proposals mirror techniques mediators commonly use to help
disputants negotiate effectively.
The Article concludes by
explaining the currently minimal role in consensual dispute
resolution played by formal trade regimes in the Americas and
suggests how these provisions could encourage mediation and
the effective outcomes this process often produces.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The phrase "Let's talk" captures mediation's approach to dispute
resolution and deal making.
Best understood as assisted and
enhanced negotiation,1 mediation permits confidential discussion

* Professor of Law, Trustee Research Fellow, and Director,
Institute for Dispute
Resolution, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Thanks to Kelly Ann L. May
of the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida and Jason McKenna, Mital
Patel, and Kerri Sigler of Elon University's School of Law for research assistance,
Joshua Farmer for technical help, and the Levin College of Law at the University of
Florida for a summer writing grant that made this article possible.
1.

See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF

ADVOCATE AND NEUTRAL 95 (2006) ("Mediation is a process of assisted negotiation in
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directed toward constructive communication. 2 Practiced for centuries
and found in most of the world's cultures, 3 mediation provides a
simple, relatively flexible process that allows people to talk and4
negotiate in the presence, and with the assistance, of third persons.
Mediators help participants better understand each other, frame
problems in ways that transcend partisan perceptions, explore
independent and shared interests, and develop solutions that promote
mutual gain. 5 Unlike arbitrators and judges, mediators do not make
binding decisions. 6 Instead, they help participants develop solutions
and stimulate disputants to make better and more mutually
rewarding agreements. 7 Mediation often produces outcomes that
exceed the narrower, win-lose legal remedies available with
8
arbitrators and judges.

which a neutral person helps people reach agreement."); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 266 (2005)
(characterizing mediation as a "a process in which an impartial third party acts as a
catalyst to help others constructively address and perhaps resolve a dispute, plan a
transaction, or define the contours of a relationship"); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER &
STEPHEN K. HUBER, MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION: REACHING AGREEMENT IN LAW AND
BUSINESS 281 (2d ed. 2007) (characterizing mediation as "facilitated negotiation,
assisted negotiation, and moderated negotiation").
GOLANN & FOLBERG, supra note 1, at 95-96.
2.
Virtually all societies have created third-party intervention to help resolve
3.
DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS
disputes consensually. See, e.g.,
CULTURES: PATHWAYS AND PATTERNS 191 (1992) (noting that the experience of
mediation is universal); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES 93 (1995) (remarking that mediation has
universal facets and performs multiple functions in all cultures); CHRISTOPHER W.
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT
19-21 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that mediation has a long and varied history in almost all
of the world's cultures).
4.
See EILEEN CARROLL & KARL J. MACKIE, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: THE
ART OF BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 3-4 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION] (remarking that mediation has an ancient history but is still relatively
new as a practical, professional dispute resolution approach); GLOBAL TRENDS IN
MEDIATION 1 (Nadia Alexander ed., 2d ed. 2006) (noting the recent emergence of
mediation in the legal and commercial dispute resolution arena despite its timeless
universality).
KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 27 (3d ed.
5.
2004); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 1, at 266-67.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 1, at 267 (stating that self6.
determination by the parties is a "central feature of mediation" and makes it
"fundamentally different from adjudication" where power to determine outcomes is
given to a judge or arbitrator).
Id. at 270 (noting that mediators help parties craft proposals that respond
7.
to and satisfy at least some of every participant's needs).
8.
Id. For example, mediation of commercial disputes can encourage parties to
'agree that they will enter into future contracts that take account of past wrong and
offer profit for all, instead of the more conventional money damages." Id. They can
include potentially valuable agreements to communicate in certain ways, write
reference letters, apologize, and refrain from specified conduct, remedial avenues
typically not available in arbitration or litigation. Id. at 270-71.
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For these and other reasons, many commercial lawyers and
scholars encourage more extensive use of mediation to resolve private
transborder commercial disputes. 9 Successful businesses increasingly
expand beyond national boundaries and create transnational
networks of customers, distributors, and suppliers. Many of the
resulting transactions generate ongoing commercial relationships
such as alliances, joint ventures, and other collaborative
arrangements. 10 Businesses make substantial investments to create
these commercial associations and then often experience the
uncertainties that interdependent relationships inevitably produce."
Commercial expansion across national boundaries brings conflict as
economic and political circumstances change, personality tensions
emerge and sharpen, and differing contractual interpretations and
other performance related perceptions arise. 12 Disagreements over
responsibilities,
obligations,
performances,
and
entitlements
13
commonly result.

Efficient methods to resolve
transborder
disagreements
contribute substantially to the growth and success of international

9.
See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, Time to Try Mediation of International
Commercial Disputes, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323, 327 (1998); Stephen K.
Anderson, Mediation and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 55 Disp. RESOL.
J. 56, 60 (2000); Alexandra Bowen, The Power of Mediation to Resolve International
Commercial Disputes and Repair Business Relationships, 60 DIsP. RESOL. J. 59, 60
(2005); Walter G. Gans, Saving Time and Money in Cross-BorderCommercial Disputes,
52 DISP. RESOL. J. 50, 52-54 (1997). As two international commercial mediators noted:
"In its combination of flexibility alongside a degree of disciplined form, mediation is
especially suited to the diversity--cultural, managerial, technical-of global business
traffic. It renews time honoured ancient processes of community tribal adjustment at a
21st Century level." INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 7. Rather than
relying on exhorting parties, settlement, or hinting at what adjudicators will do,
contemporary mediation draws on emerging knowledge about negotiation, group
dynamics, and decision making. Id.
10.
Gans, supra note 9, at 51. Transnational business involves six primary
categories: joint ventures, licensing agreements, subcontracts, management contracts,
turn key projects, and financial arrangements. Andrew Sagaratz, Resolution of
International Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriersof Culture Without Going to
Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 675, 675 n.1 (1998).
11.
George W. Coombe, Jr., The Resolution of Transnational Commercial
Disputes: A Perspective from North America, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 16
(1999); Eric Green, International Commercial Dispute Resolution: Courts, Arbitration,
and Mediation, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 175, 175 (1997).
12.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 4; Abramson, supra note 9, at
324.
13.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 4; Green, supra note
11, at 175-76; see also Gans, supra note 9, at 52 (commenting that negotiations
creating transborder commercial relationships and documents reflecting them are
unlikely to foresee "the myriad areas of possible conflict and disagreement"). Joint
ventures, in particular, tend to have short lives. More than 50% of joint ventures end
within five years, and most terminate within ten years. Abramson, supra note 9, at
324.
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trade. 14 Risks stemming from different cultural practices,
expectations, and behaviors compound in transborder commercial
relationships, and they make appropriate conflict resolution processes
essential. 15 Workable systems of transborder dispute resolution are
required for resolving private problems and protecting commercial
legal rights. 16 The limited nonviolent dispute resolution menu of
avoidance, consensual agreements, and letting outsiders decide
through adjudication, litigation, or arbitration 17 has produced an odd
result where transborder commercial disputes are frequently resolved
through arbitration, while litigation and meditation are seldom used.
No mysteries surround why companies involved in private
transborder commercial disputes avoid litigation.
Transborder
litigation of private commercial disputes adds difficulties,
complexities, and inefficiencies to the process,' 8 while most
businesses value flexible, quick, and inexpensive resolutions. 19 The
absence of a regional judicial system in the Americas with power to
adjudicate private commercial disputes means that some disputants

14.
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183,
1187 (2004); Sagaratz, supra note 10, at 675.
15.

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST:

SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES

FOR

BUSINESS USERS 319 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001)
[hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST].

16.
Id. Dispute resolution systems impact the security of business investments.
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 7 (1996).
The global economy requires dispute resolution systems that match the flexibility and
responsiveness needed for transborder business. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 12. Like U.S. corporations, Latin American businesses are looking for better
dispute resolution mechanisms to enhance their growth in the globalized market.
Horacio Falcao & Francisco J. Sanchez, Mediation: An Emerging ADR Mechanism in
Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 415, 424 (Nigel
Blackaby et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Mediation in Latin America].
17.
These three nonviolent human dispute resolution options appear to exist in
all cultures. P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 1 (1970); KARL A. SLAIKEU, WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO MEDIATING DISPUTES 16 (1996). It is apparent that business managers the
world over do not like conflicts. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 4. Faced
with disputes, managers often experience a fight-or-flight reaction and choose either to
worsen the situation with other parties by legalized fighting-i.e., adjudication-or to
flee the problem by avoiding it and doing nothing. Id. at 4-5.
18.
GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL (2003);
RICHARD H, KREINDLER, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A BASIC PRIMER (1998); RUSSELL
J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING
(4th ed. 2003); Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1188. Mercosul, the Southern Common
Market, has numerous implementing protocols containing procedures designed to
reduce the difficulties, complexities, and inefficiencies of transnational litigation
among companies based in participating countries. Nadia de Araujo, Dispute
Resolution in MERCOSUL: The Protocol of Las Lehas and the Case Law of the
Brazilian Supreme Court, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 25, 40 (2001). Unfortunately,
many procedural gaps remain and create challenges, uncertainties, and complications.
Id. at 40-50.
19.
Gans, supranote 9, at 52.
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20
must litigate under a foreign country's legal and procedural rules.
This creates enormous opportunities for lawyers to quarrel over
whether the courts selected have jurisdiction over disputes and
21
nonresident disputants.
Once jurisdictional issues are resolved, lawyers turn their
argumentative talents to quarreling over what substantive law
should be applied 22 and how evidence can be identified, gathered, and
presented at trial. 23 Private transborder litigation in the United
States, for example, presents enormous challenges for non-U.S.
litigants, because it requires them to comprehend and manipulate
fifty separate sets of state civil procedure rules, the additional overlay
of federal rules, and the impact of local rules in both state and federal
trial courts. 24 Substantial differences in trial procedures among
adversarial and inquisitorial systems create more complexities
stemming from different roles for judges and experts, methods of
establishing records, values accorded oral testimony, and appellate
options. 25 Parties fear "home town justice" from xenophobic tribunals
and worry about judicial independence and impartiality. 26 After
running this gauntlet, business disputants and their lawyers face
substantial challenges in enforcing foreign judgments, often replaying

20.
L. Richard Freese, Jr. & Robert Spagnola, New Challenges in International
Commercial Disputes: ADR Under NAFTA, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 61, 62-63;
Green, supra note 11, at 175.
21.
Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1188-89. This often brings numerous,
difficult problems resulting from separate lawsuits involving the same parties and
issues starting and proceeding in different countries. Id.
22.
Id. at 1189-90. Although not involving the Americas, Professor Carbonneau
noted that if the fading actor from California played by Bill Murray in Lost in
Translation had been involved in an auto accident while in Tokyo to film Suntory
Whiskey commercials, he would have been lost in substantive legal uncertainties as
well as in translation. Id. at 1189. In contrast, disputants in arbitration can choose
what law applies by contract, and one survey shows that they do this in 82% of
International Chamber of Commerce arbitrations. Jean-Francois Bourque, More SelfAdministration Seen in International Arbitration, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 37, 38 (1997).
23.
Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1190.
24.
Id.; Freese & Spagnola, supra note 20, at 61. Non-U.S.-trained lawyers and
business litigants in typical business cases entangled in the U.S. judicial system must
face "depositions, lengthy pretrial periods,... extensive personal time commitment by
the disputants and others, lengthy 'factual' investigations in a search for the 'truth,'
obtuse evidentiary rules, over-reliance on experts, volatility of jury trials, and common
law reliance on precedents." Id. at 62.
25.
Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1191.
26.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 320. According to
commentators, most Latin American judicial systems "are simply not responsive to
their economies' fast growing needs and evolving business cultures." Mediation in
Latin America, supra note 16, at 424. Many judicial systems in Latin America are rife
with systematic corruption stemming from low compensation, weak monitoring
systems, and other factors. Thomas J. Moyer & Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation as a
Catalyst for Judicial Reform in Latin America, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619,
637-38 (2003).
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initial jurisdictional disputes. 27 These time-consuming and expensive
aspects of commercial litigation flow directly from the fact that
dispute-creating events, transactions, and differences cross state
28
borders.
Faced with these daunting realities, lawyers and business
decision makers usually turn elsewhere to resolve differences that
The dispute
cannot be resolved through private negotiation. 29
resolution option most frequently chosen is arbitration-the
adjudicatory alternative that, like litigation, relies on outsiders to
30
decide.
Arbitration has emerged as the preferred dispute resolution
method in contemporary transborder border disputes, 3 1 even though

Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1193-94.
27.
28.
Id. at 1188. The judiciaries in most Latin American countries confront
tremendous docket overloads, and a single case may take over a decade to resolve.
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 425. Professor Carbonneau provided this
apt summary of transborder commercial litigation:
It portrays the law at its theoretical best and at its practical worst. The ethic of
pragmatism succumbs to sectarianism. The utility of litigation is corroded by
the antics of forum-shopping. After the remedial strategies have been
exhausted, judgments are likely to conflict and to be rendered ineffective. The
variability of national legal systems and the quest to find litigious advantage
confound the functionality of the process. Further, the amounts of time and
money expended to reach an inconclusive outcome is likely to have been
enormous.
Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1188.
No data was found indicating the number of private transborder
29.
commercial disputes that are successfully negotiated by either the business personnel
involved alone or in tandem with their in-house or outside lawyers. Research and
experience suggest that negotiation is the most common process used to resolve
disputes in the United States. Data suggests that lawsuits are filed in just over 10% of
the disputes involving individuals and more than $1,000, meaning 90% of these
situations are resolved without formal invocation of the judicial process. David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86 (1983). A
recent survey of litigation in U.S. federal courts showed that the percentage of cases
going to trial has dropped sharply in the past forty years, despite substantial increases
in the number of lawyers, the number of lawsuits filed, and the amount of published
legal authority. John Lande, "The Vanishing Trial"Report: An Alternative View of the
Data, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 19, 19 (2004). This Report showed that the civil trial rate
in federal courts dropped steadily from 11.5% of filed cases going to trial in 1962 to
1.8% in 2002. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459

(2004). Most of the filed disputes that do not reach trial are settled through negotiation
and mediation, or abandoned. ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING 341 (1990); Rex R. Perschbacher,

Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 75 n.2 (1985); Don Peters,
Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and
Learning Negotiation,32 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1993).
30.
JOHN W. COOLEY & STEVEN LUBET, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY 4 (1997);
KOVACH, supra note 5, at 7; MOORE, supra note 3, at 7; Sagaratz, supra note 10, at 692.
31.
Abramson, supra note 9, at 325; Anderson, supra note 9, at 58; Bowen,
supra note 9, at 60; Gans, supra note 9, at 54.
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32
its use has diminished in U.S. domestic commercial disagreements.
International commercial arbitration seeks to provide a fair and

neutral

forum

disputes.3 3

to

assess

and

decide

transborder

commercial

Compared to private transborder litigation, arbitration

may be faster and less expensive, require less involvement by
business personnel, afford participants control over the selection of
the arbitrator or arbitral panel, and involve less discovery and

appellate review.

34

As an adjudicative remedy, however, arbitration shares many of
litigation's disadvantages. Unless it produces a settlement while

unfolding,35 arbitration generates winners and losers.36

Despite

attempts to use decision making processes that respect ongoing
business associations 37 and arbitrators' oft-criticized tendency to
render compromise decisions, 38 arbitration more often ends-rather

32.
See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 5 (noting
survey of in-house counsel and outside lawyers they employ reflected a marked
preference for mediation over arbitration); David Lipsky & Ronald Seeber, In Search of
Control: The Corporate Embrace of ADR, 10 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 140 (1998)
(noting that support of arbitration among corporations is not as strong as support for
mediation); Thomas C. Waechter, Survey Says: Litigants Like What They See in
Mediation, 22 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 93, 93 (2004) (reporting a survey of
thirty-two nationally known, experienced trial attorneys that showed an overwhelming
preference for mediation over other processes, and few liking arbitration). A January
2007 survey of organizations showed mediation is the top choice of corporate counsel
and law firms. CPR Meeting Survey Finds Mediation Is Top ADR Choice, 25
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 98, 98 (2007).
33.
See Carbonneau, supra note 14, at 1195; COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS
BEST, supra note 15, at 320.
34.
Freese & Spagnola, supra note 20, at 62.
35.
A high percentage of claims submitted to arbitration are settled before
hearings. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 321. Facilitating
settlement is usually peripheral to arbitral adjudication, but arbitrators typically
inquire about and encourage negotiated agreements. Id. at 28.
36.
Walter A. Wright, Mediation of Private United States-Mexico Commercial
Disputes: Will It Work?, 26 N.M. L. REV. 57, 59 (1996); see also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 210

(4th ed. 2003)
37.
William S. Fiske, Should Small and Medium-Size American Businesses
"Going Global" Use International Commercial Arbitration?, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW 455,
462 (2005).
38.
See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 36, at 210 (noting that many argue the
parties' power to choose arbitrators encourages compromise decisions "to avoid
antagonizing" disputants "that they hope will select them" again); DAVID B. LIPSKY &
RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT
ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 26 (1998) [hereinafter
APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION] (observing that many believe
arbitrators consider the positions the parties articulate and then make awards that
split the difference between them); Freese & Spagnola, supra note 20, at 62 (noting the
perception that arbitrators frequently split the difference in their awards). About half
of 606 companies surveyed said that when they did not use arbitration, it was because
it resulted in compromise outcomes. APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
supra at 26.
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than repairs-commercial relationships. 39 Losers usually do not
want to do further business with companies that defeat them in
adjudicatory battles.
Arbitration also presents general adjudication disadvantages,
including sacrificing outcome control by delegating it to external
decision makers. 40 Resolution by arbitration focuses on backwardlooking facts, evidence, and arguments asserting and defending legal
rights rather than on present and future development of beneficial
business solutions. 4 1 It adopts formal, legalistic frames that require
the expertise of lawyers, and it often diverts time, money, and energy
to ancillary procedural quarrels. 42 Unlike litigation, arbitration

39.
Julie Barker, International Mediation-A Better Alternative for the
Resolution of Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an
InternationalCommercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1,
7 (1996) (noting that adjudication lays blame on one of the parties instead of finding
face-saving ways out of disputes); see also INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at
34 (Arbitration tends to "drive a wedge between parties." It undermines effective
interparty communication, generates self-protectionism and escalating arguments, and
focuses information exchange on "historic evidence."); Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz
Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedure: Detailed Analysis
Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006);
Thomas W. Walde, Pro-Active Mediation of International Business and Investment
Disputes Involving Long-Term Contracts: From Zero-Sum Litigation to Efficient
Dispute Resolution, TRANSNAT'L
DiSP. MGMT.,
May
2004, available at
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tvI-2article
101b.htm (noting that parties generally seek to continue international commercial
relationships even after disputes).
40.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 6; Abramson, supra
note 9, at 325; Barker, supra note 39, at 7; Bowen, supra note 9, at 63; Coombe, supra
note 11, at 25. The most frequently identified reason for choosing mediation, listed by
82% of 606 Fortune 1000 U.S. companies surveyed, was that "it allows the parties to
resolve the disputes themselves." APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
supra note 38, at 18. Another survey revealed 81% of 254 U.S. corporate general
counsel, or persons in equivalent positions, chose mediation because it allows parties to
resolve disputes themselves. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE-WISE
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN
MANAGING BUSINESS CONFLICTS 19 (2006) [hereinafter DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT].
41.
Gans, supra note 9, at 53; Green, supra note 11, at 177-78. Adjudication
seeks legal solutions based on entitlements and rights and emphasizes the roles
lawyers play, often excluding others with "commercial, technical, or people expertise."
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 6; see also supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
42.
Coombe, supra note 11, at 25; see also Stephen J. Burton, Combining
Conciliationwith Arbitration of InternationalCommercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1995) (suggesting that zealous, opportunistic litigation
practices are increasingly supplanting courtly manners in international commercial
arbitration); Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs:
Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business
Disputes, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 27, 29 (1995) (noting that arbitration has become more
formal and increasingly like U.S.-style litigation as it has become more successful and
institutionalized).
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seldom produces outcomes that establish precedent or articulate
43
influential business policy.
In addition, oftentimes arbitration is neither less expensive nor
faster than litigation. 44
Absent custom-designed arbitration
processes tailored to specific disputant needs and dispute
characteristics, 45 substantial time and money is often spent selecting
arbitrators 46 and wrangling about information gathering. 4 7 For
example, several transborder investment arbitrations conducted
pursuant to NAFTA and bilateral investment treaties required four
48
years to conclude and cost millions of U.S. dollars.

43.
APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 25
(noting that companies prefer litigation when they want a court decision to set
precedent or there are important principles are involved); see also Robert L. King,
Screening Device Determines ADR Suitability, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG.
7, 9 (1997) (including considerations of precedent and policy-making in a checklist for
determining ADR suitability).
44.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 320-21; Panel
Discussion, Inside the Corporation: Involving Business Managers in ADR, 16
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 151, 159 (1998) [hereinafter Involving Business
Managers]. One lawyer summarized the structural problems with arbitration in its
current form as "too slow, cumbersome, and expensive. It has allowed itself to be
cluttered with the paraphernalia of due process, which is at once the glory and the
bane of the Anglo-Saxon judicial system." Id. According to the counsel from a large
energy company, "[a]rbitration is proving to be just as burdensome as litigation. The
opposition can use arbitration to elongate the process. It can take over six months to
simply agree on an arbitration panel. You can be constantly running back to
arbitrators for decisions on discovery." APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
supra note 38, at 25.
Another in-house counsel commented that "[airbitration
oftentimes includes the worst characteristics of litigation without any of the benefits."
Id. Concerns also exist that arbitral tribunals are so focused on future appointments
and post-award attacks that they often exhaust procedures to the fullest extent
regardless of delays and costs. Walde, supra note 39, at 2.
45.
See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 43
(encouraging contracting parties to custom draft in order to meet specific needs);
KATHLEEN M. SCANLON, DRAFTER'S DESKBOOK: DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES 1.13
(noting that parties can address their concerns when drafting contract clauses because
arbitration is usually a creature of contract).
46.
See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 36, at 210 (arguing that parties may focus
so much on selecting arbitrators they hope will favor their positions that they do not
take advantage of opportunities to select decision makers with expertise).
47.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 349-56.
Conflicting rulings have resulted on the question of the validity of a statute authorizing
U.S. courts to issue orders to produce documents or testimony from U.S. participants in
international arbitrations. Id. at 349. Disputes about depositions and document
requests are common. Id. at 350-51.
48.
Burton, supra note 42, at 637; Walde, supra note 39, at 2. International
arbitration's expense can be considerable, particularly when U.S.-style litigation
techniques are engrafted. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in
the Making of ArbitrationAgreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1189, 1208 (2003). A
domestic commercial dispute subjected to arbitration under a contract clause took
seven years, cost $100 million, and ultimately settled at mediation. Richard Reuben,
The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, 82 A.B.A. J. 54, 58-59 (1996).
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International commercial lawyers tend to view arbitration the
way attorneys view courts for domestic disputes. 49 Consequently,
businesses typically do not choose arbitration in international
settings because it is faster, less expensive, or more private than
litigation. 50
They choose arbitration because they see no real
litigation alternative. 5 1 As a result, arbitration has become the
primary method that businesses use to resolve transborder
commercial disputes. 52
The number of mediations in private
transborder disputes is low compared to the number of arbitrations.
This Article investigates reasons why businesses do not use
mediation more frequently to resolve private transborder commercial
disputes. After analyzing common barriers to selecting mediation
within and between private businesses in transborder contexts, the
Article suggests several approaches to help disputants overcome
these obstacles. To the question "Can we talk?" this Article responds
' Yes, we can" and concludes by proposing two critical conversations
commercial clients should have with their lawyers and with each
other.

II. COMMON BARRIERS TO MEDIATING PRVATE
TRANSBORDER DISPUTES

Although disputes between businesses engaged in transborder
collaborations are inevitable, 53 efficient and fair resolution of these
conflicts, regrettably, is not. 54 Adjudication remains the primary
dispute resolution choice, despite the escalating costs of arbitration
and litigation. 55
In addition, settlements negotiated during

49.
Abramson, supra note 9, at 325; Freese & Spagnola, supra note 20, at 62.
50.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supranote 1, at 458.
51.
Id. Large U.S. law firms often consider international commercial
arbitration as simply a kind of litigation in a different forum. Dezalay & Garth, supra
note 42, at 56. They consider procedural attacks and discovery maneuvers as weapons
to deploy in conflicts that will inevitably end in negotiated outcomes before final
hearings. Id.
52.
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9,at 58 (noting that arbitration is a chosen
method of dispute resolution in international commercial disputes); Barker, supra note
39, at 6 (same); Gans, supra note 9, at 54 (noting that arbitration is the preferred ADR
method).
53.
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
54.
Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to
the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 235 (1993).
55.
The costs of arbitrating transborder disputes are often very high. See Gans,
supra note 9, at 54 (noting that administered arbitration costs are traditionally high);
Walde, supra note 39, at 1-2 (observing that arbitral adjudication is generally very
costly, and massive cost overruns are the rule rather than the exception); see also supra
notes 45-49 and accompanying text. So are the costs of litigation. See, e.g., Curtis H.
Barnette, The Importance of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Reducing Litigation Costs
as a Corporate Objective, 53 ANTITRUST 277, 278 (1984); Craig A. McEwen, Managing

1262

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

IVOL. 41:1251

adjudication are influenced by predictions of potential outcomes and
are typically suboptimal because they fail to realize all gains actually
56
available in these disputes.
Court-mandated mediation in the United States and the United
Kingdom has increased the use of and familiarity with impartial
57
third-party-assisted negotiation in domestic commercial disputes.
Research shows that lawyers who have participated in a mediation
value it more than those who have not experienced the process, 58 and
business managers and executives are likely to respond similarly. 59
Perhaps unfortunately, no regional judicial body has the power to
create and administer mandatory mediation systems for transborder
commercial disputes.
The absence of judicial power to mandate mediation leaves the
choice of a dispute resolution process in transborder commercial
disputes to affirmative decisions by disputants. These decisions may
be made prior to initiation of the dispute through dispute resolution
contract clauses in documents creating transborder transactions.

Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective Use of Mediation for
Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 7 (1998);
The Corporate Counsel Section of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Legal Development Report
on Cost Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 263, 265 (1995).
One very large corporation's internal study reported a nine-fold increase in legal costs
over ten years, while another reported a ten-fold escalation. McEwen, supra at 7.
56.
See Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For?":
Mediation's Value-Added for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 8 (1996).
57.
Penny Brooker & Anthony Lavers, Mediation Outcomes: Lawyers'
Experience with Commercial and Construction Mediation in the United Kingdom, 5
PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 162, 172 (2005); Deborah Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How
the ADR Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 18587 (2003). It has been estimated that half of U.S. state courts and nearly all federal
district courts sponsor mediation programs. Hensler, supra at 185. Similar directions
and encouragement of mediation exist in Argentina, Australia, Canada, France,
Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, New Zealand, Poland, Uganda, and Singapore.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 11.
58.
Don Peters, To Sue Is Human; To Settle Divine: Intercultural
Collaborationsto Expand the Use of Mediation in Costa Rica, 17 FLA. J. INT'L LAW 9, 12
(2005) [hereinafter Mediation in Costa Rica]; Reuben, supra note 48, at 57; Nancy A.
Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 142 (2004). In Latin America, successful personal
experience with mediations themselves or by trusted colleagues provides the most
convincing reason to use mediation. Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 429.
Florida lawyers representing individual and company clients in civil matters over the
last twenty years in Florida have experienced court-ordered mediation when disputes
arise and litigation results. This exposure and experience has helped many of these
lawyers forget that they once held skeptical views about mediation, because they now
know how it can be a valuable tool for negotiating and problem solving. Mediation in
Costa Rica, supra at 12.
59.
Without experiencing successful mediation, executives and managers are
skeptical of how it enhances and assists negotiation. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 114-15. Those who have experienced mediation in transborder commercial
disputes, however, "attest to its effectiveness across a diverse range of international
conflicts." Id. at 8.
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Most private transborder commercial arbitrations, 60 as well as most
domestic arbitrations, 61 are created by such contract clauses. These
decisions, negotiations, and agreements regarding the dispute
resolution processes to be used may also be made after disputes
62
arise.
Deciding which dispute resolution process to use is one of the
most important steps in resolving transborder conflicts efficiently and
effectively. 63 This decision is typically made by business executives
in consultation with their in-house and outside counsel. 64 Persons
acting in all of these roles confront, often unknowingly, common
cognitive and cultural barriers that impede them from considering,
recommending, and using mediation to resolve disputes before ceding
outcome control to arbitrators.
These barriers undoubtedly
contribute to failures to use mediation in transborder disputes in
which it is arguably appropriate. 65 The next Part of this Article
analyzes the most important of these barriers and then suggests ways
to overcome them.
A. Cognitive Barriers
Although business executives and lawyers undoubtedly believe
that their decisions regarding which dispute resolution process to use
are reasoned, objective, and rational, substantial evidence suggests
their beliefs are not necessarily accurate. 66
Psychologists
demonstrate that many cognitive, social, and emotional forces
frequently distort rational decision making. 67
Persons making

60.
SCANLON, supra note 45, at 1.13; Survey Says InternationalArbitration Is
Satisfying, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG.183, 183 (2001).
61.
See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 45, at 1.13 (noting that arbitration usually
occurs pursuant to a pre-dispute contract clause); Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de
Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for
Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 90 (2005) [hereinafter

Sticky Defaults] (noting that 89% of business respondents in survey conducted by
American Arbitration Association said they arbitrated because it was contractually
required).
62.
See Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 88 ("Choosing an appropriate way to
resolve a dispute can be done ex ante in a contract. The parties can also choose ex post,
once they find themselves in an actual dispute.").
63.
Sander & Rozdeiczer, supra note 39, at 4.
64.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 7-8.
65.
See Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 83 (noting the psychological and
cognitive barriers to dispute resolution).
66.
Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, PsychologicalPrinciples in NegotiatingCivil
Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1999). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET
AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
67.
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE

VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 156 (2000). These forces result from predictable, hardwired mental predispositions. Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision
Biases in Negotiation, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 689 (2005).
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complex decisions, such as considering and pursuing dispute
resolution methods, frequently use intuitive approaches and mental
shortcuts to reduce the complexity and effort involved in reasoning
about these questions. 68 These intuitive approaches and mental
shortcuts involve automatic, unconscious processes that are difficult
to counter.6 9 They manifest the Paleolithic human mind in today's
postmodern age. 70 They also exercise substantial influence if, as
scholars contend, human thought is primarily unconscious 71 and most
72
human thinking occurs outside of conscious awareness and control.
Many cognitive barriers interact and combine to create a
powerful win-lose bias and zero-sum dispute resolution mindset for
both businesspersons and their lawyers. The mental shortcuts
feeding this bias include selective and partisan perception,
73
egocentrism, optimistic overconfidence, and fixed-pie assumptions.

68.
Adler, supra note 67, at 690-91; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 351, 351 (Andrea Kupfer
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK].
69.
Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 3-4.
70.
Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, In Our Bones (Or Brains):
Behavioral Biology, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 68, at 283, 284.
These intuitive biases and mental shortcuts are "so deeply engrained that they
undoubtedly have an evolutionary basis." Adler, supra note 67, at 692. Human
behavior, at its most fundamental level, is a biological phenomenon. Yarn & Jones,
supra, at 284.
[U]ltimately, all theories about human behavior are theories about the brainan organ operating on physical principles that receives stimuli, makes
computations, and directs behavioral outputs. Far from being an all-purpose
computer or blank slate, the brain has been shaped over millions of years by
evolutionary forces producing a species-typical brain that produces speciestypical behavioral outputs in response to various stimuli.
Id. Professors Yarn and Jones argue that "behavior that seems irrational in a present
environment may be perfectly rational when considered in the context of' a physical
and social environment when the challenges primarily were food choice, predator
avoidance, and mate selection. Id.
71.
Wendell Jones & Scott H. Hughes, Complexity, Conflict Resolution, and
How the Mind Works, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 485, 487 (2003) (arguing that discoveries
in the past twenty to thirty years in physics, microbiology, the neurosciences, cognitive
psychology, and linguistics have profound implications for how humans create reality
from our sensory experiences and view interaction and conflict).
72.
Id. These scholars argue that, as humans perceive and respond, their
minds are "constantly making and remaking neural connections. Sensorimotor
experiences generate and stimulate neural structures that interact and respond in
complex ways" with human brains and all their subsystems. Id. at 488. They then
conclude that no disembodied logic exists that humans can exercise separately from the
embedded neural activities of their brains. Id.
73.
Max H. Bazerman & Katie Shonk, The Decision Perspective to Negotiation,
in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 52, 53 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C.
Bordone eds., 2005) (hereinafter DISPUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK).
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All cognitive and behavioral activity regarding choosing and
implementing a dispute resolution process starts with perception of
details and meanings in situations and contexts, 7 4 and bases its
reasoning, predictions, and decisions on conclusions derived from
these perceptions. 75 As a way to manage the overwhelming stimuli
the brain receives, humans perceive selectively and in potentially
biased ways by noticing and emphasizing some things, while ignoring
others. 76 Access to different information 77 and past experiences
strongly influence and bias this selective perception. 78 This human
tendency means that businesspersons from different parts of the
same organization often see dispute contexts, situations, and
objectives differently, 79 and these different perceptions may influence
discussions and decisions about how to resolve transborder
In addition, in-house lawyers employed by
disagreements.80
companies perceive these dispute contexts and situations selectively
81
and differently than outside attorneys retained for specific matters.
The dynamics of conflict and dispute also influence human
perception, and these forces transform the effects of bias from merely

74.
75.

Peters, supra note 29, at 13.
Sheila Heen & Douglas

Stone,

Perceptions and Stories, in THE

NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 68, at 343, 345-47.

Id. at 344. As humans proceed through life, the amount of information in
76.
terms of sights, sounds, facts, and feelings available in single encounters is so
overwhelming that they necessarily notice some things and ignore others. DOUGLAS
STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO Discuss WHAT MATTERS MOST 31

(1991). "User illusion" describes the cognitive bias resulting from the common beliefs
humans hold that they perceive everything in situations but in fact notice only a very
small slice of available information, often as little as 1% of the stimulus field. Heen &
Stone, supra note 75, at 344; TOR NORRETRANDERS & JONATHAN SYDENHAM, THE USER
ILLUSION: CUTTING CONSCIOUSNESS DOWN TO SIZE 277 (1991); LEIGH THOMPSON, THE
MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 192 (2005).
Heen & Stone, supra note 75, at 344. Separate businesses obviously have
77.
access to different information, with each presumably knowing its own strengths,
challenges, constraints, and finances better than it knows other companies with whom
it collaborates and potentially conflicts. STONE ET AL., supra note 76, at 33.
78.
Heen & Stone, supra note 75, at 344. Insights from memory research
suggest "what has happened to us in the past determines what we take out of daily
encounters in life." DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE
MIND, AND THE PAST 3 (1996).
See Heen & Stone, supra note 75, at 344 ("[I]n any organization, where you
79.
sit determines what you see.").
See Involving Business Managers,supra note 44, at 156 (observing that turf
80.
problems are common in large business organizations where managers involved in the
dispute often don't want someone looking over their shoulders, telling them what to do,
or examining what happened to see if a mistake had been made).
81.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 7-8, 27. The long-term relationships inside
counsel have with their clients allow them to think broadly about dispute management
policies and lessen concerns about malpractice exposure for recommending settlement
before acquiring full information. Id. Outside lawyers, on the other hand, are often
engaged on case-by-case arrangements and this encourages them to focus on specific
disputes and urge caution regarding settlements. Id.
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As disputes emerge and grow, 8 3 emotions
Many, if not most, transborder business
disputes engender strong emotions in the parties involved. 8 5 When a
critical mass of strong emotions such as disappointment, distrust,
4

frustration, and anger emerge, companies typically start considering
86
dispute resolution options.
Humans generally find it extremely hard to distance themselves
from their idiosyncratic roles sufficiently to view the disputes in
which they are involved objectively.8 7 Partisan perception encourages
humans to accept their beliefs and analyses as accurate, 8 8 seek out
information that supports these views, recall this-but
not otherdata, and revise memories to fit their perspectives. 8 9
Partisan
perception also influences humans not to look for disconfirming data
and to discount or diminish it when encountered. 90
Consequently,
much less perceptual time and effort is spent seeking information

82.

ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH

CONFLICT 21-31 (1994).
83.
Leonard Greenhalgh, Managing Conflict, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS,
EXERCISES, AND CASES 7, 9 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
84.
See Heen & Stone, supra note 75, at 345 (noting that disputes trigger
emotions, which affect the brain's perceptual processing by creating chemicals like
adrenaline, cortisol, dopamine, serotonin, norepinephrine, and oxytocin); see also
STEPHEN JOHNSON, MIND WIDE OPEN: YOUR BRAIN AND THE NEUROSCIENCE OF
EVERYDAY LIFE 150-57 (2004). When strong emotions are in play, perception is slowed,
subtleties and specifics are missed, and the memories retained are much cruder and
contain less complexity and specificity. Heen & Stone, supra note 75, at 345.
85.
See David A. Hoffman, Paradoxes of Mediation, in BRINGING PEACE INTO
THE ROOM 167, 172 (Daniel Bowling & David A. Hoffman eds., 2003).
86.
Inside the Law Firm: Dealing With Financial Disincentive to ADR, 17
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 43, 45 (1999) [hereinafter Dealing With Financial
Disincentives to ADR] (arguing that business litigation is often "driven by emotional, as
opposed to economic, factors" and generally "does not occur until a certain 'critical
mass' of emotional content is achieved").
87.
Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 14; Lyle A. Brenner et al., On the Evaluation
of One-Sided Evidence, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION-MAKING 59, 59 (1996).
88.
This tendency of humans to assume their views are necessarily reasonable,
objective, and correct has been called naive realism. Keith G. Allred, Relationship
Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention With Cooperation, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 83, 84. This separate cognitive bias has
three aspects: (1) typically assuming we are reasonable and objective when confronting
a problem or question; (2) assuming that anyone looking at the same data would draw
the same conclusions we do; and (3) suspecting unreasonableness or harmful motives
when others reach different conclusions from the same data. Id.
89.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 98; FISHER ET AL., supra note 82, at 22.
90.
Id. Humans do this because their "brains work hard to tell simple stories
consistent with what" they already know, and for protection from "the discomfort of illfitting data hanging around" their memory banks. Heen & Stone, supra note 75, at
346-47.
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that supports other perspectives 9 1 and the interests of other
92
disputants.
Biased selective and partisan perceptions then cause decision
makers to develop and suffer from the common cognitive biases of
egocentrism and optimistic overconfidence. 9 3 Egocentrism describes
the tendency of humans to bias their perceptions and predictions in
self-serving ways9 4 that reflect their preexisting beliefs. 9 5 Once
humans select interpretations they view as beneficial, they typically
96
gather and organize information to justify these choices.
The common tendency of decision makers to act overconfidently
derives from egocentric biases.9 7 Studies of decision making by
professionals in many occupations consistently show tendencies to
make unrealistically optimistic or overconfident forecasts regarding
future outcomes. 98
U.S. lawyers routinely display optimistic
overconfidence. 99 One study found that, on average, U.S. lawyers
rated themselves in the eightieth percentile or higher on their
abilities to predict litigation outcomes. 100 Dispute resolution decision
makers may be similarly optimistically overconfident in evaluating
their chances of winning transborder commercial
dispute
arbitrations. 101 These biases toward inaccurately assessing and
predicting future adjudicatory outcomes can lead business

91.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 98; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44,
47 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
92.
FISHER ET AL., supra note 82, at 22-28; ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO
YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 51 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
GETTING TO YES].
93.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 98.
94.
Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 73, at 52, 55; Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at
14.
95.
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining
Table, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 68, at 354. A related positive
illusion bias frequently accompanies overconfidence. It is the tendency to overestimate
abilities to control outcomes that are determined by outside factors. Birke & Fox, supra
note 66, at 16-17. Another related bias flows from tendencies to hold overly positive
views of one's attributes, abilities, and competencies. Id. Most persons see themselves
as more intelligent and fair minded than average. Id. Research shows that most
negotiators perceive themselves as "more flexible, more purposeful, more fair, more
competent, more honest, and more cooperative than counterparts." Id. at 18; see also
Roderick M. Kramer et al., Self-Enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects
of Self-Esteem and Mood, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 10 (1993).
96.
Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 73, at 55.
97.
Id. at 56
98.
Id. at 57; Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 18.
99.
Richard Birke, Settlement Psychology: When Decision-Making Processes
Fail, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 212, 214 (2000).
100.
Id. For example, when students who failed to reach agreement negotiating
a simulated dispute were then asked to estimate the odds that an arbitrator would
choose their proposal, the average estimate was 68%. Bazerman & Shonk, supra note
73, at 55-56.
101.
Id. at 57.
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representatives and their lawyers to choose arbitration as the best
10 2
process for realizing their overconfident projections.
The tendency to view the resolution of disputes as involving the
division of limited resources 10 3 supplies a final cognitive barrier
generating a pervasive win-lose, zero-sum bias in favor of
adjudication and against mediation. Often called the fixed-pie bias,
this mental shortcut relies on unconscious

assumptions that the

subjects comprising legally framed disputes-monetary payments or

production and performance concerns-are limited, 10 4 and that all
disputants value them equally. 10 5 This bias generates the belief that
disputants' interests are always diametrically opposed.10 6 This belief
usually results in the view that one disputant's gain is invariably
10 7
another disputant's loss.
These common cognitive biases are all experienced by
businesspersons and lawyers, and they create a powerful and
108
pervasive zero-sum, win-lose bias.

This mindset frames all dispute

resolution activity as exclusively or primarily requiring individual,
gain-maximizing thinking and behavior. Scholars investigating how
professionals develop competence suggest that the most common set

of behavior patterns displayed by practitioners in law, business,
public administration, and industrial management reflects actions

102.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 99; Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 15;
Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 73, at 57.
Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 73, at 54; Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 30;
103.
Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution and How
to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 213, 216-17 (Morton
Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman, eds. 2000).
Thompson & Nadler, supra note 103, at 216-17. One study showed that
104.
more than two-thirds of participating negotiators assumed the items negotiated were
limited, even though this was not the case. Thomson & Nadler, supra note 103, at 217.
105.
See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 29, at 377-78 (arguing humans
tend to assume that parties want the same things and possess the same values).
106.
Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 30. From an interest perspective, this bias
creates views that all interests are conflicting, and that neither independent nor
shared interests exist. Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Heuristics in
Negotiation: Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING IN
ORGANIZATIONS 51 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983).
Thompson & Nadler, supra note 103, at 217.
107.
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 168. These scholars offer this apt
108.
summary of the prevalence of this mindset:
Lawyers and clients too often assume that legal negotiations are purely
distributive activities. "Our interests are opposed to theirs; what one side wins,
the other side loses." This zero-sum mindset is powerful and pervasive.
Lawyers often report that legal negotiating is, by definition, strategic hard
bargaining. Although they acknowledge that sometimes value-creating moves
are possible, particularly in deal-making, they assume that value creation is
merely icing on the cake which still has be sliced up through a distributive
struggle. Clients frequently share this view and expect their lawyers to behave
accordingly.
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directed toward striving to win and seeking to avoid losing.1 0 9 Prior
vivid experiences with purely distributive competitive experiences,
such as athletic activities, university admissions, and many
organizational promotion systems, contribute to this mindset; 110 so do
economic theories and business models that advance winning and
avoiding losing as primary, often exclusive, objectives. 1 '
U.S. lawyers approach dispute resolution with this win-lose
mindset. 112 A survey of two thousand Arizona and Colorado lawyers
showed pervasive use of win-lose assumptions in negotiations. 113 A
New Jersey study of 515 lawyers and 55 judges revealed that about
70% of cases in which they participated were negotiated using actions
based on win-lose thinking derived from fixed-pie cognitive
assumptions. 114 A study of how both the public and lawyers view
lawyers suggests that adversarial behavior flowing from a win-lose
115
mindset is highly ranked by both audiences.

109.
CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING
PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 63-84 (1974); DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN
THE PROFESSIONS 256-59 (1987); Lee Bolman, Learning and Lawyering: An Approach
to Education for Legal Practice, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIENTIAL SOCIAL PROCESS 111,
119-20 (Cary L. Cooper & Clayton P. Alderfer eds., 1978).
110.
Bazerman & Shonk, supra note 73, at 54.
111.
ALFIE KOHN, NO CONTEST: THE CASE AGAINST COMPETITION 70 (1986). This
win-lose bias breeds substantial psychological resistance to mediation's use. Catherine
Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 847, 861
(1996); Marguerite Millhauser, ADR as a Process of Change, 6 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 190, 190 (1988).
112.
Available data suggests that a substantial majority of U.S. lawyers
approach negotiation from a win-lose mindset derived from its underlying biases.
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 29, at 374; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754, 764-75 (1984); Don Peters, Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing: Facilitating
Learning Negotiation, Mediation, Interviewing, and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875,
914 (1996).
113.
DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 29
n.6 (1989); Peters, supra note 29, at 28 n.i. Professor Gerald Williams conducted a
study in which 67% of the lawyers surveyed reported that they primarily sought to
maximize gain when they negotiated. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT 15-40 (1983).
114.
Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and
Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want,"
12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 253, 255 (1997). Sixty percent of the respondents in this
survey believed that non-zero-sum-based dispute resolution techniques should have
been used more often. Id.
115.
See Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report
on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 191-92. The hero image,
described as aggressive and competitive, was the image valued most by lawyers and
the public. Id. at 180, 181. Lawyers chose "competitive" as the adjective most
applicable to attorneys while the public selected it as the second most applicable term.
Id. at 191-92. Dispute resolution scholars contend that perspectives embedded in the
adversarial style of litigation practiced in the United States and given extensive
emphasis in U.S. legal education pervade the lives of U.S. lawyers. E.g., Leonard L.
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Research also shows that dispute resolvers typically manifest
fixed-pie bias at the beginning of most resolution-oriented
interactions, 116 and
that
they often
resist
disconfirming
information. 117 This leads many lawyers to transfer their win-losebiased negotiation habits to mediations. 118 U.S. business executives
complain about their lawyers' use of counterproductive, excessively
adversarial behaviors that interfere with exploring business interests
and finding suitable solutions in mediations. 119
The cumulative influence, of these cognitive biases affects the
decisions that business representatives and their lawyers make when
they confront a serious transborder dispute that cannot be resolved
by private negotiation. 120 The frequent choice to arbitrate rather
than mediate these disputes 121 probably results from applying a winlose mindset and its supporting cognitive biases to assess, reason, and
choose the adjudication process that best avoids the problems of

Riskin, Mediation and Layers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 30 (1982). U.S. legal education
strongly emphasizes adversarial adjudicatory processes and thinking, while other
countries in the Americas, such as Mexico, do not. Anderson, supra note 9, at 59. These
attitudes, orientations, and experiences create a standard philosophic map for U.S.
lawyers that contains core assumptions that disputants are adversaries in win-lose
contests and that all disputes should be resolved through third-party application of
legal rules. Riskin, supra at 43-44. Research suggests that the win-lose dispute
resolution mindset begins much earlier for U.S. residents than in law or business
school. Psychological students reveal that, given options of cooperating for mutual gain
or competing generating no gain, U.S. children prefer to compete. John J. Dieffenbach,
Psychology, Society, and the Development of Adversarial Posture,7 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp.
RESOL. 261, 265-74 (1992).
116.
Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 30-31; Leigh Thomspon & Terri
DeHarpport, Social Judgment, Feedback, and Interpersonal Learning in Negotiation,
58 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 327 (1994).
117.
Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 31; see also Leigh Thompson & Dennis
Hrebec, Lose-Lose Agreements in Interdependent Decision-Making, 120 PSYCHOL. BULL.
396, 407 (1996) ("There is always the thorny problem of verification in the presence of
incomplete information ...").
118.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics, Morality, and Professional
Responsibility in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE 119, 137-38 (Phyliss Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002) (noting that
mediators report encountering, particularly in caucuses, the same win-lose, adversarial
behaviors that occur in nonmediated negotiations); Don Peters, When Lawyers Move
Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DISP.
RESOL. 119, 138 [hereinafter Attorney Truthfulness] (observing that many
counterproductive mediation behaviors "flow from a frame of reference most lawyers
use resulting from their immersion in an adversary system"); Stephen P. Younger,
Effective Representation of Corporate Clients in Mediation, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 951, 959
(1996) (noting that little is gained from lawyers treating mediation as requiring "hardnosed bargaining and adversarial posturing").
119.
Business Mediation, from All Points of View, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 101, 101 (2006) (stating that business mediations suffer from lawyers "who
focus primarily on positions and don't truly understand what developing the
underlying interests means"); see also infra note 351 and accompanying text.
120.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 84, 110-11.
121.
See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
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transnational litigation. 122 Most U.S. lawyers, and probably many
attorneys in other countries, see adjudication as the fallback option if
negotiations fail, 123 and maintaining the status quo strongly
124
influences many decisions.
Disputants often avoid changing a method they have used in the
125
past even when new approaches might prove more beneficial.
Latin American businesspersons and lawyers share these tendencies
126
to prefer traditional, adjudicatory approaches to dispute resolution.
This produces wariness and resistance to change, and makes
mediation a hard sell despite its advantages over adjudication in
127
many situations.
When combined with adjudication's tendency to conflate all
client interests into monetary units, 128 these cognitive and cultural
biases often influence lawyers to narrowly frame 129 mediation as "a
euphemism for taking less money.' 130 Lawyers and businesspersons
often excessively fear that mediation lessens the chance to maximize

122.
See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
123.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 111.
124.
Id. at 93. Scholars have described human tendencies to rely on familiar,
traditional, existing practices as a "status quo bias." Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default
Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (1998) [hereinafter Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation].
125.
Anderson, supra note 9, at 58; see also Bowen, supra note 9, at 60 (arguing
that humans tend to fear unknowns and see arbitration as easier because it delegates
decision making to external experts). These psychological tendencies include "fear of
the unknown, fear of making a mistake, fear of failure, and fear of being judged."
Millhauser, supra note 111, at 190. Millhauser further argues that, "for many, one of
the attractions of the law and lawsuits is the orderliness of procedure-the myriad of
rules and regulations that govern every move." Id. Emphasizing that the hallmarks of
mediation are "more flexibility and less structure," Millhauser argues that for those
who are more rule-bound, mediation "can be a nightmare." Id.
126,
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 428.
127.
Id.
128.
Birke, supra note 99, at 215. This adjudicatory frame converts all tangible
and intangible client needs into dollars and cents and turns resolution "into
distributive tugs of war" even when doing this disserves clients. Id.
129.
Frames are perceptions disputants hold about conflicts and how issues in
them should be presented and resolved. Marcia Caton Campbell & Jayne Seminare
Docherty, What's in a Frame, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK, supra note 68, at 36.
Frames profoundly influence a participant's strategic thinking and behavior. Id. They
influence dispute resolution process choice and experiences within it. See Howard
Gadlin et al., The Road to Hell is Paved with Metaphors, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK, supranote 68, at 29.
130.
Arbitration/Mediation/Settlement/Other
Forms of ADR, 15 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 59, 62 (1997).
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gain. 13 1 They also associate mediation with a strong likelihood of
132
having to make concessions.
This zero-sum, fixed-pie framing of mediation triggers another
common and powerful cognitive bias: loss aversion. 133 This cognitive
bias inclines decision makers to attribute more weight to potential
losses than to possible gains. 134 Gains and losses are assessed in
relation to a reference point, 135 which is usually the expected outcome
of arbitral adjudication in transborder commercial disputes. 1 36 In
addition, research consistently demonstrates that the framing of
options in terms of losses or gains can substantially affect resulting
decisions. 137
Even when opportunities and risks are identical,
perceiving options as gains makes decision makers more likely to
accept them, while viewing options as losses makes rejection more
138
likely.
When lawyers and businesspersons frame the dispute resolution
method choice by comparing a victory in adjudication against
concessions in mediation, mediation is seldom selected.' 3 9 Research
also suggests that decision makers will usually take more risks to
avoid losses.' 4 0 This bias can affect all disputants who choose to seek
a victory in arbitration to avoid any amount of loss, even though
continuing the dispute in arbitration risks economic harm that often
14 1
far exceeds concessions likely to result from mediation.

131.
MOORE, supra note 3, at 82; Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note 58, at 11.
132.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 100; see also APPROPRIATE CORPORATE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 26 (noting the widely recognized view that
using mediation tends to result in compromise agreements).
133.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 99-100.
134.
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 161; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note
91, at 44, 54; Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 99.
135.
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 161; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453,
456 (1981) ("Outcomes are commonly perceived as positive or negative in relation to a
reference outcome that is judged neutral.").
136.
See Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 99 (arguing the current option serves
as the reference point to which options are compared).
137.
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 162; see also Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer,
76 TEXAS L. REV. 77, 96 (1997) (predicting "that disputants would be more likely to
favor the certainty of settlement over the risk of trial if the settlement is coded as a
gain, rather than a loss ... ").
138.
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 163 (noting that mediators have long
known that settlements are more likely when they emphasize gains including closure,
achieving certainty, and avoiding additional costs than when they emphasize loss
stemming from movements from initially articulated positions).
139.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 100.
140.
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 161 ("People are ... risk-seeking
concerning losses if there is some chance, however small, of evading any loss.");
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 95, at 357 (observing that decision makers more likely
to prefer riskier choices if they hold any chance of avoiding losses).
141.
Mnookin, supra note 54, at 244.
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The power of this win-lose bias can be seen in how infrequently
mediation is chosen over litigation and arbitration in domestic
contexts. 14 2 For example, in Europe the voluntary use of mediation
typically occurs in less than 2% of disputes ultimately brought before
courts. 143 Studies in the United Kingdom showed slight use of
mediation in construction and family matters before mandatory
mediation was adopted. 144 A survey in Los Angeles showed that
mediation was used voluntarily in approximately 1% of all
145
disputes.
U.S. businesses are generally well-informed about the drawbacks
of litigation and frequently have the resources to choose dispute
resolution options that avoid it. 1 46 They are repeat players in the
U.S. litigation system 14 7 and file four times as many lawsuits as
individual clients do. 148 Although the lack of information about
mediation is often argued as a reason for its relatively infrequent
use, 149 research shows that U.S. businesses and lawyers generally
have information about mediation. 150 A survey of corporate lawyers
working for 606 of the 1,000 largest U.S.-based companies showed
151
that nearly all reported some experience with mediation.
Another study of non-lawyer business executives, inside counsel,
and outside lawyers showed that 76% of the respondents who had
personal experience with mediation were satisfied with the process,

142.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 92.
143.
Id. at 90.
144.
See Brooker & Lavers, supra note 57, at 167 (noting that fewer than 4% of
litigants used mediation in construction disputes, and only 5% used it in family
matters).
145.
Elizabeth Rolph et al., Escaping the Courthouse: Private Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Los Angeles, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 277, 285. A survey of 446
Minnesota lawyers showed that, before a mandatory mediation provision was enacted,
47% never or rarely used mediation, while 13% used it often. Barbara McAdoo & Nancy
Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's PhilosophicalMap, 18 HAM. J.
PUB. L. & POL. 376, 385 (1997). U.S. mediation programs that depend upon voluntary
participation usually attracted relatively few participants even when offered at low or
no cost. Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note 58, at 10; Rosselle L. Wissler, The Effects
of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and
Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 565, 570 (1997).
146.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 90.
147.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 26; Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen,
Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early
Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 831, 839 (1998); Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV.
95, 97-104 (1975).
148.
Carmel Sileo & David Ratcliff, Straight Talk About Torts, TRIAL, July 2006,
at 44.

149.
See Anderson, supra note 9, at 58 (opining that the ignorance of mediation
among NAFTA countries is primary reason process not used more frequently).
150.
Sticky Defaults, supra note 61, at 90.
151.
Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 32, at 137.
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and 73% were satisfied with the results. 152 In addition, 81% of
outside lawyers, 73% of inside counsel, and 84% of executives agreed
that mediation was appropriate in half or more than half of business
disputes currently being litigated. 153 Only 16% of executives, 19% of
outside lawyers, and 27% of inside counsel indicated that mediation
was appropriate in less than half of the commercial disputes
154
currently being litigated.
Despite these supportive attitudes toward mediation, U.S.
businesses do not use mediation very often. 155 A 2006 study by the
American Arbitration Association showed that only 7% of companies
156
surveyed use mediation very frequently, and 17% use it frequently.
This study also reported that 35% use mediation occasionally, 25%
1 57
use the process rarely, and 16% do not use it all.
A comprehensive survey of six large U.S. corporations showed
several instances where these companies failed to increase their use
of mediation 158 even though business principals supported increased
159
use, their lawyers favored it, and general counsel encouraged it.
Specific directives from general counsel in two of the companies to
use mediation more frequently failed. 160 Four companies pursued
several educational programs about mediation, but this had no
noticeable effect on its use in two of these corporations. 161 One
general counsel commented that he "[could not] think of an initiative

152.
John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 176 (2000).
153.
Id. at 172-74.
154.
Id.
155.
APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 10 ("Only
19 percent of those who had used mediation reported using it frequently or very
frequently."). The reality of U.S. corporate experience with ADR "is one of significant
breadth but little depth." Id.
156.
DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 17; Sticky
Defaults, supra note 61, at 90.
157.
DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 17.
158.
Rogers & McEwen, supra note 147, at 841.
159.
Id. Although five of these corporations had signed a Center for Public
Resources Pledge to use mediation before resorting to adjudication, mediation use in
three of these companies remained at similar levels to the one organization that did not
sign the pledge. Starting in the mid-1980s, the Center for Public Resources (now the
CPR Institute) has encouraged and distributed a pledge to U.S. corporate leadership.
F. Peter Phillips, How Conflict Resolution Emerged Within the Commercial Sector, 25
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 3, 6 (2007). This pledge simply stated that the
signer would consider using ADR in any dispute with another company who had also
signed the statement. Id. at 6-7. As of the beginning of 2007, this pledge had been
"signed by or on behalf of 4,000 corporations, representing in economic influence more
than two-thirds of the gross national product." Id. at 7.
160.
Rogers & McEwen, supra note 147, at 841-42.
161.
Id.
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B. CulturalBarriers
A decision to mediate a commercial dispute typically involves
163
businesspersons and their legal counsel, both outside and inside.
Culture supplies a frequently used analytical metaphor for examining
belief patterns, shared expectations, and behavioral norms of
individuals and groups acting within organizations. 164 This
perspective suggests that barriers to the use of mediation arise from
both business and legal cultures in America.
Contentious, competitive business cultures exist, and they
generate disputes initially while erecting barriers to efficient
resolution. 165 Company lawyers note that their "business people
think that they are right all the time."'1 66 Key individuals in
companies often get personally and emotionally invested in disputes
in ways that influence selection of resolution methods. 167 Corporate
lawyers explain that angry businesspersons with strong emotions
often dictate the choice of adjudication, even though this is not the

162.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). British litigators have had difficulty
making a transition to mediation from their traditional advocacy roles. Int'l Inst. for
Conflict Prevention & Resolution, How Business Conflict Resolution Is Being Practiced
in China and Europe, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 148, 149 (2005). One

British litigator remarked that "for years and years [litigators] have been paid to
disagree, and suddenly we're being expected to be paid to agree." Id.
163.
Lande, supra note 152, at 218.
164.
See Melanie Lewis, Systems Design Means Process Precision, but
Emphasizes Culture, Value, and Results, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 116,
117 (2007) (noting that improving businesses' conflict resolution approaches requires
improving company culture); see also CALVIN MORRILL, THE EXECUTIVE WAY: CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN CORPORATIONS (1995); Catherine Cronin-Harris & Peter H. Kaskell,

How ADR Finds a Home in Corporate Law Departments, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COSTS LITIG. 158 (1997).

165.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 9. Tough guy cultures in company departments
often generate disputes that create adjudication. Id. at 10. "Macho" management is a
common source of adversarial position taking that causes disputes and encourages
adjudication. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 115.

166.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 10.
167.
Id. One general counsel noted this happens "[e]specially when there is
emotion, if they think they've been wronged. We've had our share of experience with
executives digging their heels in." Id. Another business lawyer in this study noted:
The most difficult thing for us here is to get managers to cool off and back
down. It's the lawyers that emphasize the need to settle. The lawyers are
pragmatists. So we pursue what is most reasonable and fastest. The lawyers
try to separate the emotional issues, the egos involved, and the facts of the
case. The lawyers would like the facts to prevail but often emotion takes over.
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most effective method of dispute resolution. 168 Lawyers handling
1 69
business disputes deal extensively with company politics.
Although the cognitive biases examined earlier heavily influence the
judgments underlying these competitive perspectives, they are often
170
reinforced by organizational expectations and norms.
The professional culture of U.S. lawyers also erects barriers to
recommending and using mediation to resolve transborder disputes
in ways that transcend the cognitive biases of partisan perception,
Professional
fixed-pie assumptions, and win-lose thinking.
before
needed
information
of
extent
the
regarding
expectations
inhibit
often
for
example,
options,
about
resolution
clients
counseling

recommending mediation. 171 With emphasis on thoroughness and
172
gathering all possible data to best predict adjudicatory outcomes,
conventional legal wisdom holds that serious settlement discussions
should be postponed until the maximum available information is
obtained. 173 Many business lawyers believe that clients cannot settle
until they know all the facts. 174 Given their litigation orientation,
many outside lawyers do not feel comfortable analyzing settlement
175
possibilities until they have fully prepared for trial.

Id. Middle managers often make decisions that generate interbusiness
168.
disputes, want these judgments supported by top management, and feel undermined if
mediation results in outcomes that do not fully vindicate their actions. APPROPRIATE
CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,

supra note

38, at 24. A large pharmaceutical

company lawyer reported that the company chose not to use mediation, which might
have saved millions of dollars in litigation costs, because middle managers believed
such a policy would undercut their authority. Id. This evidence supports the maxim
that commercial disputes are usually personal disputes in disguise.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 10. Corporate political issues include how
169.
performances are evaluated if cases settle and do not provide objective win-lose
adjudicatory measures, and whether suggesting mediation is perceived as signaling
weakness. Cronin-Harris, supra note 111, at 861.
Two international mediators suggest that "the greatest constraint on
170.
mediation usage is self-imposed, the fact that managers and lawyers often resist
entering the process." INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 114. The survey of
606 Fortune 1000 companies revealed that a lack of interest from senior management
often caused businesses not to choose mediation. APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 26. This was the fourth most common barrier to
mediation use, listed by 28.6% of respondents. Id.
See McEwen, supra note 55, at 12; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 147, at
171.
842.
See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT172.
CENTERED APPROACH 306-07, 358-63 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that counseling tasks

include helping clients assess likelihood that specific adjudicatory consequences will
occur).
173.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 115; McEwen, supra note 55,
at 12; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 147, at 842. This delay usually occurs until
lawyers find sufficient information bolstering their case and they have confidence that
their clients will not concede too much when negotiating. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION,
supra note 4, at 115.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 12.
174.
Dealing with FinancialDisincentives to ADR, supranote 86, at 46.
175.
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This cultural orientation encourages lawyers to weigh formal
information discovery procedures-available only in adjudication176
U.S. civil
heavily when recommending dispute resolution methods.
litigation generally permits broad document discovery, including
discovery of electronic communications, and extensive opportunities
to secure pretrial witness testimony, even from persons disputants do
not intend to use as witnesses. 17 7 Driven by a commitment to do
high-quality, careful work, 178 U.S. commercial lawyers emphasize the
risks run if formal discovery is not pursued. 179 Selling a mediation
initiative to resistant attorneys requires changing the dispute-based
80
culture of the legal profession.'
Decisions to mediate transborder disputes usually involve
businesspersons and lawyers from different cultures, and often from
different legal systems.' 8 ' Cultural differences-reflecting dynamic,
growing, interrelated, and shared mental perceptions about what is
appropriate in human interaction 8 2-present additional barriers to
mediating transborder commercial disputes.
These shared
perceptions contain categories and implicit rules that persons use to
interpret events, behaviors, and communications.' 8 3 They influence

176.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 12. Gaining access to these remedies supplies
another impetus for lawyers to counsel adjudication even though access to these tools
in arbitration may be eliminated or limited by contract clauses or rules of
administering organizations. Generally, discovery in international commercial
arbitration is more limited than the expansive discovery allowed in U.S. litigation.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 349. Depositions are rare and
other discovery procedures are usually limited to those allowed by arbitral rules, party
agreements, or arbitrators' decisions. Id. at 351.
177.
Phillips, supra note 159, at 5.
178.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 13.
179.
Id. at 12. Business lawyers describe discovery's importance in U.S. legal
culture and suggest its use will never diminish because lawyers don't want to feel
disadvantaged dealing with opponents. Id.
180.

APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,

supra note

38, at

25

(noting that changing the ways businesses and their lawyers approach dispute
resolution requires changing the culture of handling disputes); INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that culture change needed to add mediation to
lawyers' dispute resolution tool kit). As one general counsel put it: "It's still a cultural
challenge outside the US to go to mediation . . . [because tihere is a psychological
inhibition about going to a third party rather than court-it's the problem of 'if I can't
resolve it, no one can' philosophy." INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 114.
181.
Bowen, supra note 9, at 60-61.
182.
E.g., AUGSBURGER, supra note 3, at 25; RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING
ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
14-15 (1997); MICHELLE LEBARON, BRIDGING CULTURAL CONFLICTS 4 (2003).

183.
LEBARON, supra note 182, at 10; Paul R. Kimmel, Culture and Conflict, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 103, at
453, 455; Don Peters, "It Felt Like He Was in My Skin:" InterculturalLearning About
Mediation in Haiti, 2 RUTGERS CONFLICT RESOL. J. 1-7 (2004), available at
http://www.pegasus.rutgers.edu/-rclj/ [hereinafter Mediation in Haiti].
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attitudes, action habits, and behavioral norms regarding how
184
disputes are perceived, expressed, managed, and resolved.
Commonly encountered cultural differences stem primarily from
fundamental distinctions between emphasizing individual or
collective values, and preferring to communicate directly or
indirectly.' 8 5 Most wealthy Western countries, for example, have
individualistic traditions of direct communication, while most Latin
American countries possess collectivistic traditions and tendencies
toward indirect communication.' 8 6 These fundamentally different
orientations create common misunderstandings regarding win-lose or
win-win orientations, emphasizing contracts or relationships,
formality or informality, time sensitivity, risk taking, and top-down
or consensus-based team organization.' 8 7 These and other cultural
differences create gaps between what persons using one set of
cultural assumptions intend by actions, and the meanings others
using different shared mental precepts attribute to these
88
behaviors.'
These differences create enormous challenges to consensual
resolution of disputes through negotiation and mediation. 18 9 One
example that illustrates the complexity of cultural' 90 interaction
concerns challenges arising from different understandings of what
mediation actually involves and whether it is the same as or different

AUGSBURGER, supra note 3, at 22; Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building
184.
Cross-CulturalCompetence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 40 (2001); Mediation in
Haiti,supra note 183, at 17-18.
185.
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES 14-15 (1980); Jeanne M.
Brett et al., Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation, 8 NEGOT. J. 61, 63-64 (1998);
Mediation in Haiti,supra note 183, at 21.
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 435; Wright, supra note 36,
186.
at 64-66.
187.
CHARLES M. HAMPDEN-TURNER & FONS TROMPENAARS, BUILDING CROSSCULTURAL COMPETENCE: HOW TO CREATE WEALTH FROM CONFLICTING VALUES 11

(2000); Ben Chen Goh, Typical Errors for Westerners, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK, supra note 68, at 293-300; Jeswald W. Salacuse, Ten Ways that Culture
Affects Negotiating Style: Some Survey Results, 8 NEGOT. J. 221, 223 (1998). Another
classification system for cultural differences identifies thought patterns and belief
systems, behavior, relationship patterns and social norms, and corporate, political, and
legal system variations. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 15-16.
188.
Bowen, supra note 9, at 60.
See AUGSBURGER, supra note 3, at 24-25; Bowen, supra note 9, at 60-61.
189.
Not understanding potential cultural differences raises grave risks that negotiators
and mediators will miss important verbal and nonverbal cues, misinterpret speech and
behavior, misread meanings, and confuse primary and secondary issues. Mediation in
Haiti,supra note 183, at 18.
"Intercultural" connotes interpersonal interactions with persons from
190.
cultures other than their own. KENNETH CUSHNER & RICHARD W. BRISLIN,
INTERCULTURAL INTERACTIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, ix (2d ed. 1996). These
interactions are also often called cross-cultural. Id.
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from conciliating. 191 Confusion exists regarding whether mediation
and conciliation are different terms for the same process or
19 2
significantly different processes.
Many commentators contend that although mediation is
internationally known as conciliation, the terms are essentially
synonymous. 193 The United Nations Commission on International

191.
No international consensus exists regarding what mediation is and how it
works. Wright, supra note 36, at 59. Latin American countries, for example, use
different words to describe mediation and define it in different ways. Mediation in
Latin America, supra note 16, at 446. These differences stem from diverse historical
evolutions, different international influences, and the varied roles of their legal
institutions. Wright, supra note 36, at 59; see also Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note
58, at 23 (describing a lively discussion at a conference in San Jose, Costa Rica,
regarding whether mediation and conciliation are different words for the same process
or significantly different processes).
192.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 116; GLOBAL TRENDS IN
MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 3; Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note 58, at 23. Some
lawyers and scholars contend that these are different processes. One empirical study
suggested that Costa Rican lawyers may view mediation and conciliation as separate
processes. Jurgen Nanne Koberg, Costa Rican Commercial Arbitration Rules and the
U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 33 n.8 (1996). An April
1995 CID-GALLUP survey indicated that 38% of the lawyers surveyed accepted
conciliation as an alternative dispute resolution method and 31% accepted mediation.
Id. International trade legal traditions and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
"distinguish them by defining them differently." Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman,
Traditionand Innovation in InternationalArbitrationProcedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 89,
105 n.89 (1995). Mediation, as defined by the World Trade Organization, involves
impartial persons who help parties resolve disputes. Hansel T. Pham, Developing
Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the DSU, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 331, 366 (2004). The WTO then defines conciliation as involving impartial persons
who undertake independent investigations and suggest resolutions. Id.; see also
GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 2. This distinction posits that
mediation creates a primarily facilitative role for neutrals while conciliation generates
an evaluative role that approaches nonbinding arbitration. Other scholars define
mediation and conciliation in directly opposite ways by reversing the degree of thirdparty involvement attributed to each. Rau & Sherman, supra, at 105 n.89. They argue
that mediation is primarily evaluative and conciliation is primarily facilitative,
contending that mediators not only facilitate but also make their own
recommendations, so that mediation is conciliation plus evaluation. E.g., Lord
Wilberforce, Resolving International Commercial Disputes: The Alternatives, in
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA 7, 7 (Robert K. Patterson & Bonita J.
Thompson eds., 1987); Rau & Sherman, supra, at 105 n.89.
193.
Jernej Sekolec & Michael B. Getty, The UMA and the UNCITRAL Model
Rule: An Emerging Consensus on Mediation and Conciliation, 2003 J. DiSP. RESOL.
175, 175 (arguing that mediation, or conciliation, fundamentally differs from trial and
arbitration because it encourages parties to resolve their differences consensually with
the help of third parties rather than using third parties to decide their disputes). Many
scholars treat these terms interchangeably by writing about mediation or conciliation
in ways that attribute no meaningful differences to the label used. See, e.g., James T.
Peter, Med-Arb in InternationalArbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83, 83 n.1 (1997)
(arguing that no distinction between mediation and conciliation exists and that
mediation covers all kinds of techniques); Rau & Sherman, supra note 192, at 105 n.89
(contending conciliation seems to be a more familiar term in international commercial
contexts although "there can hardly be any substantive significance in the use of one
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Trade Law (UNCITRAL) for International Commercial Conciliation
says as much when it defines conciliation as "a process, whether
referred to by the expression conciliation, mediation, or an expression
of similar import, whereby parties request a third person or persons
('the conciliator') to assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable
settlement of their dispute."'1 94 Despite deriving its core concepts
from the U.S. experience of mediation, 195 the process is known as
196
conciliation in most Latin American countries.

III.

YES, WE CAN OVERCOME COGNITIVE AND CULTURAL
BARRIERS TO MEDIATING

Choosing the appropriate dispute resolution process for a
197
particular conflict presents important, challenging questions.
Persons making these decisions in private transborder commercial
disputes usually include representatives of the businesses involved
and their lawyers, including both in-house and outside counsel. The
cognitive biases and cultural patterns of all these participants must
1 98
be identified and overcome in order to consider mediation fully.
Shared biases within such decision-making groups often influence
group assumptions and constrain conventional ways of acting. 199

term rather than the other"). They claim that both describe a process where third
parties without authority to decide issues help disputants negotiate. Erik Langeland,
The Viability of Conciliation in InternationalDispute Resolution, DISP. RESOL. J., July
1995, at 34. They contend that perceived differences are negligible, and that efforts to
distinguish between mediation and conciliation are "pointless" and demonstrate
academic "attempts to dichotomize a continuum." Rau & Sherman, supra note 192, at
105 n.89.
194.
Sekolec & Getty, supra note 193, at 185.
195.
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 416; see also INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 116 (arguing mediation is increasingly recognized globally
as "a flexible process of professionally assisted, structured negotiations").
196.
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 421.
197.
Sander & Rozdeiczer, supra note 39, at 1. A leading dispute resolution
scholar noted that "trying to decide what kind of case belongs in which forum remains
one of the most interesting and understudied questions." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What
Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1613, 1617 (1997).
198.
Involving Business Managers, supra note 44, at 155. Resistance to
mediation often comes when lawyers or businesspersons need to prove points, or are
not fully familiar with the process, or experience cultural tendencies pushing against
it. Id. If one, or all, parties prefer adversarial, position-based arbitral adjudication,
"there can easily be a dance of delay, isolation, escalation of conflict and mutual
damage to the point where the costs become disproportionate to the business value" of
claims. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 115.
199.
See FISHER ET AL., supra note 82, at 72-73 (noting that group assumptions
frequently generate extensive self-censorship and inhibit sharing new ideas).
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A. Overcoming Cognitive Barriers
Overcoming cognitive barriers starts with lawyers and
businesspersons accepting ownership of them and acknowledging the
likelihood that they will influence their perceptions, predictions, and
analysis of what dispute resolution method to use. 200 Awareness of
these ingrained, pervasive influences helps decision makers avoid
their harmful effects. 2 01 Developing self-awareness by enhancing
their abilities to monitor and reframe thoughts and emotions helps
lawyers and businesspersons understand and effectively deal with
their
predictable
"non-rational
impulses
and
error-prone
tendencies." 20 2 It also helps decision makers identify situations in
which they must consciously override, or take compensatory actions
203
to avoid, these tendencies and mental shortcuts.
Although it is challenging, egocentric biases stemming from
selective and partisan perception can be mitigated by explicitly listing
adverse consequences, drawbacks, and weaknesses of all options,
perspectives, and objectives under consideration. 20 4 Disputants
should adopt a "devil's advocate" approach to identify and assess all
countervailing considerations to their natural biases. 2 0 5 Given the
subtlety and intractability of egocentric biases, however, playing
devil's advocate is seldom sufficient.20 6 Appointing a group member
to advocate other views honestly and bluntly helps offset natural
biases, 20 7 and greater numbers of people involved in these
conversations typically increases the effectiveness of this approach.
Noting adverse consequences, drawbacks, and weaknesses in writing
also counters tendencies, influenced by partisan perception and

200.
201.
202.

Adler, supra note 67, at 690-91; Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 3-4, 19.
Adler, supra note 67, at 690-91.
Id. at 691. As some scholars claim:

The best protection against all psychological traps is awareness. Forewarned is
forearmed. Even if you can't eradicate the distortions ingrained in the way your
mind works, you can build tests and disciplines into your decision-making
process that can uncover and counter errors in thinking before they become
errors in judgment.
JOHN HAMMOND ET AL., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER
DECISIONS 214-15 (1999).

203.
Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 4.
204.
Id. at 19; see also Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing
Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 920 (1997).
205.
This requires using a technique which originated in the Middle Ages. Adler,
supra note 67, at 765. Candidates for sainthood were represented before the papal
court by two spokesmen: the advocatus dei, who made the case for canonization, and
the advocatus diaboli, who advanced all conceivable arguments against canonizing the
candidate. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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those
dismiss
or
diminish
overconfidence,
to
optimistic
208
weaknesses.
Overconfidence biases may be mitigated by carefully evaluating
the adverse consequences, drawbacks, and weaknesses identified, and
by seeking outsider perspectives. 20 9 Obtaining outsider perspectives
includes seeking evaluation data from similar situations rather than
basing predictions entirely on scenarios derived solely from inside
It also includes seeking to observe and analyze
disputes. 210
situations from different points of view. 211 Role reversal often
212
identifies the concerns, issues, and objectives of other disputants.
Seeking to identify the probable perspectives of third parties, such as
arbitrators or mediators who may ultimately hear both sides of a
2 13
dispute, also counters overconfidence.
Examining the business interests involved in situations combats
Interests are the needs or
fixed-pie and zero-sum biases. 2 14
motivations that disputants possess, 215 and in business disputes they
typically encompass economic, relational, substantive, and procedural
factors. 2 16 Business interests usually include resolutions that save
time and money, preserve relationships, and create satisfactory,
durable, and confidential outcomes. 217 Most disputes have multiple
variables, and disputants typically possess complex interest sets that
interact with these factors. 218 Adopting adjudication's win-lose focus
directed primarily at money obscures opportunities to reach

208.
This is why mediators often write important, disconfirming data on white
boards or flip charts in caucus rooms-so that the information remains visible and is
less easily discounted even when they are not present. See BINDER ET AL., supra note
172, at 320-21 (recommending making written charts of options, advantages, and
disadvantages to help clients make satisfactory decisions). In an international
commercial mediation, drawing the dispute on a flip chart to demonstrate overlapping
business interests brought insight and breakthrough to one of the disputants.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 20.

Birke & Fox, supra note 66, at 19.
209.
210.
Id.; Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:A
Cognitive Perspectiveon Risk-Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 25 (1993).
211.

FISHER ET AL., supra note 82, at 32.

212.
Id. at 33-35.
213.
Id. at 32.
Birke & Fox, supranote 66, at 31.
214.
215.
GETTING TO YES, supra note 92, at 40-50; David A. Lax & James K.
Sebenius, Interests: The Measure of Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS,
EXERCISES, AND CASES 130-37 (Roy J. Lewicki et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993).
216.
See, e.g., DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 19
(listing reasons companies use mediation).
217.
See, e.g., id. (listing these as reasons companies use mediation);
APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 17 (same); see also

supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Michael L. Moffit, Disputes as Opportunities to Create Value, in THE
218.
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 73, at 173, 176.
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resolutions that satisfy multiple interests and allocate value more
219
flexibly than winner-take-all.
Perhaps ironically, all of these suggestions apply mediation
principles and replicate actions mediators use to help negotiators
220
move past cognitive biases to mutually acceptable agreements.
Mediators, for example, often try to reduce the effect of bias by
explaining common cognitive patterns and encouraging participants
to reassess their views with more objectivity. 221 Asking lawyers to
assume a loss and then explain why arbitrators might have ruled
against them combats these biases. 222 To make disputes seem less
unique, mediators also inquire about broader contexts than particular
2 23
controversies.
Mediators provide outside perspectives that challenge egocentric
biases. 224 They ask direct questions that raise weaknesses in legal
claims and occasionally share hypothetical claim evaluations to
encourage
disputants and lawyers to abandon optimistic
overconfidence. 22 5 Mediators also encourage negotiators to consider

219.
Birke, supra note 99, at 215-16.
220.
See GOLANN & FOLBERG, supra note 1, at 203-10 (describing how mediators
help disputants overcome cognitive forces affecting their abilities to assess the merits
of cases); Mnookin, supra note 54, at 248 (arguing mediators can help parties overcome
cognitive barriers).
221.
Russell Korobkin, Psychological Biases that Become Mediation
Impediments Can Be Overcome with Interventions that Minimize Blockages, 24
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 67, 68 (2006). Substantial evidence suggests that
this seldom accomplishes much because people tend to be "optimistically overconfident
about their ability to avoid suffering from the optimistic overconfidence bias." Id.
222.
Id. at 69. This generates specific explanations for undesirable outcomes,
increases the plausibility of these reasons, and can reduce optimistic overconfidence.
Id. Studies show that persons believe an outcome is more likely to occur if they explain
why it might because of a phenomenon called the explanation bias. Id.; Craig A.
Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the
Persistenceof Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037, 1047
(1980).
223.
GOLANN & FOLBERG, supra note 1, at 205 (noting that, to combat optimistic
overconfidence, mediators often seek to distance participants from claims by asking
them to place it in a group of similar ones and inquiring broadly about the group, and
using other approaches to make particular disputes seem less unique). Mediation tends
to develop much more comprehensive information and insight than does arbitration.
Walde, supra note 39, at 3. Unlike arbitrators who wait for evidence and argument
presented to them in formalized ways, mediators ask questions and penetrate deeply
into disputants' organizations, cultures, values, and concerns. Id.
224.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 23. Neutral, impartial
mediators are not distracted by substantive issues that concern parties, and they
escape the political and group decision-making dynamics that burden disputants. Id. at
31. Mediators can typically win trust and respect quicker from disputants than other
participants can because they are outside the partisan fray. Id. at 30. This enables
mediators to ask challenging questions without generating the defensiveness that
partisan inquiry produces, check agreement alternatives firmly and fully, and apply
more leverage to encourage flexibility and movement. Id.
225.
Brooker & Lavers, supra note 57, at 200-01; Korobkin, supra note 221, at
69. Direct questions regarding weaknesses, and hypothetical claim evaluations and
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the weaknesses of their claims when evaluating settlement offers that
emerge. 226 Executives might accept a mediator's suggestion of
relative fault when the contributions of the executives' businesses to
the disputes might be deemed significant in later adjudications. 227
Mediators explore disputants' alternatives to a mediated
agreement 228 and the transactional costs associated with these
options. 22 9
Because alternatives to mediation are usually

outcome predictions, usually temper lawyer overconfidence, stimulating them to at
least consider possibilities that they have misestimated. Korobkon, supra note 221, at
69. Controversy rages in the United States over whether it is appropriate for mediators
to share hypothetical or actual claim evaluations or outcome predictions. The current
ideological struggle treats facilitation, which does not do this, and evaluation, which
does, as separate mediating models. Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator PracticeModels: The
Intersection of Ethics and Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 703,
705 (1997). Scholars define facilitation as proper or correct mediation. James J. Alfini,
Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of Good Mediation?, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 47, 48 (1991). Scholars define evaluation as improper or incorrect
mediation. John Lande, Stop Bickering! A Call for Collaboration,16 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 11 (1998). This debate obscures the fact that most commercial
mediators routinely use actions that fall into both categories. Don Peters, Oiling Rusty
Wheels: A Small Claims Mediation Narrative, 50 FLA. L. REV. 761, 835 n.163 (1998).
"[D]irect evaluation often is necessary to overcome overconfidence bias." Korobkin &
Guthrie, supra note 68, at 352. Some U.S. mediation rules prohibit mediators from
predicting how judges will decide pending adjudications. E.g., FLA. R. CERT. & CT.APPOINTED MED. 10.370(c), availableat http://www.mediate.com/articles/floridarules.cfm.
226.
GOLANN & FOLBERG, supra note 1, at 204; Korobkin, supra note 221, at 68;
Peters, supra note 225, at 807-08 n.76. This is often done by asking questions
confidentially in caucuses about the strengths of counterparts' claims, exploring topics
that usually parallel their weaknesses. Some studies "have successfully reduced
optimistic overconfidence by asking experimental subjects to list weaknesses associated
with their position." Korobkin, supra note 221, at 68-69. This may have lessened the
effect on lawyers who are aware that counterparts will make countering arguments
and have often identified these contentions in advance. Id. at 69. Trial lawyers
surveyed listed attorneys' failures to view claims and positions reasonably and
convince clients of their cases' weaknesses as primary factors in unsuccessful
mediations. Waechter, supra note 32, at 99.
227.
John Lande, Relationships Drive Support for Mediation, 15 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 95, 96 (1997). Mediation provides a forum "where senior
executives can hear the issues set out by both their own team and the other side."
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 23. One disputant in an international
mediation mentioned that he was unsure how strong his claim was and "wanted to
hear it debated in an information setting." Id. at 24. Business clients often complain
that their lawyers do not discuss weaknesses in their claims and instead emphasize
only the strong points. Younger, supra note 118, at 957.
228.
See SLAIKEU, supra note 17, at 32 (suggesting good mediators want to know
what disputants will likely do if they don't resolve their disputes in mediation). These
alternatives provide standards against which to measure solutions proposed in
mediation. Id. Identifying and discussing these alternatives to negotiated agreements
ensures that participants do proper risk analysis. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 22.
229.
Arbitration and litigation present direct and indirect costs. INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 35. These costs should be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 in
international disputes. Id. at 36. Many companies mask the financial impact of these
costs as operating expenses under corporate accounting practices. Id. Outside counsel
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adjudicative, these discussions cover all the expenses of arbitrating,
including direct, 230 productivity, 23 1 continuity, 2 32 and emotional
costs. 233 Reducing transaction costs often creates value in dispute
23 4
resolution.
The direct costs of international arbitration are often significant
235
Most
and sometimes wind up exceeding actual amounts gained.
U.S. businesspersons and inside lawyers believe that mediation is
less expensive than arbitration. 23 6 U.S. businesspersons also believe

fees, while often substantial, may be the tip of the iceberg because "they don't reflect
hours spent by company personnel managing the legal work," or emotional and other
nonfinancial costs. Resources and Data: How Mediation Is Practiced in Europe, 23
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 98, 100 (2005) [hereinafter How Mediation Is

Practicedin Europe].
230.
Direct costs include the fees of lawyers, experts, other professionals, and
arbitration system fees. Stewart Levin, Breaking Down Costs: What You Are Losing by
Not Using ADR, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 235, 235 (2001). Regarding

litigation costs, it has been estimated that, in 2000, more than 22 million cases were
filed in U.S. courts at a cost of almost $400 billion. Id.
231.
Productivity costs include the value of lost time, and the related
opportunity expenses, of those who are involved in dispute resolution. Id. It has been
estimated that business executives in the United States spend more than 20% of their
time on litigation and other dispute resolution related activities. Id.
232.
Continuity costs include the loss of business relationships and the impacts
on business community and reputation factors that they embody. Id. at 248.
233.
Emotional costs include the psychological pains that accompany dealing
with and continuously confronting strong emotions that often distract from
businesspersons' ability to focus on doing their work effectively. Id. at 248.
234.
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 119 (arguing that the resolution of
disputes does not require purely distributive activity, and disputants and lawyers have
opportunities to make process decisions that promote resolution at lower cost); Moffitt,
supra note 218, at 177 (contending that unresolved disputes are expensive, and so are
many aspects of dispute resolution, so disputants should choose carefully the process to
use).
235.

See APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 20

(noting that some report that transaction costs of settling disputes subjected to
adjudication are often two to three times the amounts of settlement themselves). These
questions occasionally surface situations where businesspersons have not recognized
their shared interests in minimizing arbitration costs and fees when their lawyers have
not so advised them. Mnookin, supra note 54, at 248.
236.

See, e.g., APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at

17 (comparing both processes to litigation, 89.2% think mediation saves money, and
68.6% think arbitration does); DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40,

at 19 (comparing both processes to litigation, 91% think mediation saves money, and
71% think arbitration does); Analyzing Company ADR System Practices, 22
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 47, 53 (2004) (referencing a survey at Johnson &

Johnson that showed mediation settling costs were one-third less than litigation costs).
A survey of 69 companies showed that 71% reported cost savings when comparing
mediation to litigation costs, and 44% reported cost savings comparing arbitration to
litigation. Catherine Cronin-Harris & Peter H. Kaskell, How ADR Finds a Home in
Corporate Law Departments, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 158, 159 (1997). A
2007 survey of 126 in-house and outside lawyers showed the top reason they preferred
mediation was its cost savings. CPR Meeting Survey Finds Mediation Is Top ADR
Choice, supra note 32, at 98.
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that mediation generally takes less time than arbitration, 237 and time
238
is usually a component of expense.

Similarly,

commercial

mediators

invariably

inquire

about

disputants' business and other interests. 239 Often held in caucuses,
these conversations explore the disputants' core concerns and
strongest motivations. 240 These conversations demonstrate that more

is usually at stake than the dollar claims generated by adjudicatory
win-lose remedies. 241 They further demonstrate that value-creating
opportunities usually lie beneath the divergent and conflicting legal
positions, justifications, and supporting and attacking arguments
242
lawyers develop and present in adjudicatory contexts.
In addition, the business and other interests in play in
commercial disputes frequently bear little relationship to the legal
issues framed in adjudicatory processes like arbitration and

237.
See APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 17
(reporting that as compared to litigation, 80.1% use mediation to save time, while
68.5% use arbitration to save time); DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note

40, at 19 (reporting that as compared to litigation, 84% use mediation to save time,
while 73% use arbitration to save time); Lande, supra note 152, at 184 (74%-75% think
mediation resolves matters within appropriate time and appropriate costs). A random
sample of Indiana lawyers believed that mediation significantly reduced time needed to
conclude nonfamily cases. Morris L. Medley & James A. Schellenberg, Attitudes of
Attorneys Toward Mediation, 12 MEDIATION Q. 185, 190 (1994). In Latin America,
mediation's informality allows it to be "fast and effective" and not "as slow and
expensive" as litigation. Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 419. A
Scandinavian supplier and an Asian producer opted for a three-day mediation in
London rather than an arbitration the disputants separately estimated would take one
to two years and cost over one million pounds each. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 6.
238.
The London-based Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution reports the
average length of its transborder commercial mediations is two days. INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION, supra note 4, xiii. Commercial mediations often create a momentum
toward and expectation of agreement. Id. at 29. Transborder mediations confront and
help resolve problems of distance between disputants. Id. The mediator's involvement
encourages participants to deal with different cultural senses of time and urgency by
introducing quasi-formal, quasi-public dimensions of negotiating. Id.
239.
See GOLANN & FOLBERG, supra note 1, at 154 (arguing that good mediators
will attempt to encourage participants to identify their underlying interests during
caucuses); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 1, at 228 (excerpting Lela P. Love,
Training Mediators to Listen: Deconstructing Dialogue and Constructing
Understanding, Agendas, and Agreement, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 27
(2000)) (suggesting that interests, as "the underlying and inescapable human
motivators that press us into action," supply one of the building blocks of constructive
dialogue).
240.
Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 118, at 134.
241.
Id.; see also supra notes 8, 41 and accompanying text.
242.
See supra notes 8, 41 and accompanying text. International commercial
mediations typically seek to broaden discussions to include technical, reputational, and
cultural concerns that are often obscured by the ways legal claims frame issues.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 24-26.
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litigation. 24 3 For example, saving time and money and preserving
relationships are typically business-oriented solutions that legal
244
remedies adjudicated in arbitration and litigation do not promote.
Once mediators identify interests, they typically explore ideas in
confidential caucuses for agreements that realize shared concerns,
such as reducing transaction costs and preserving important
commercial relationships.
Development and maintenance of international commercial
Research suggests that
connections takes time and money. 245
businesspersons and their lawyers believe that mediation helps
commercial
while
preserving
important
resolve
disputes
relationships. 246 This frequently shared interest enables mediators to
help participants turn disputes into deals by finding ways to solve
precise problems presented and resume strengthened commercial
2 47
relationships.
Mediators challenge fixed-pie, zero-sum biases by testing the
assumption that all participants value all aspects of disputes
They conduct confidential discussions about how
identically. 248

Phillips, supra note 159, at 6. Describing the growth of mediation within
243.
the commercial sector in the United States, the author contends that adjudicatory
solutions look backward to determine the consequences of past events while business
interests look forward to assess future opportunities. Id.; see supra notes 8, 41.
244.
Phillips, supra note 159, at 5-6 ("This company makes money producing
many things, from light bulbs to jet engines-but it does not make money writing legal
briefs in court.") (quoting a senior General Electric attorney). The author also argues
that "it might well be that the best solution to a dispute between a dam builder and a
hydroelectric turbine manufacturer would be a change in contract specifications and a
promise of future work. But the law does not provide for this business-like solution."
Id.; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
245.
Walde, supra note 39, at 1 (noting that creating international commercial
and investment relationships is an expensive, high-risk, asset-building activity).
246.
Eighty percent of the business executives, lawyers, and outside attorneys in
one study said that mediation helps preserve business relationships. Lande, supranote
152, at 186. This finding is consistent with other studies suggesting that
businesspersons and their lawyers believe that mediation preserves relationships
better than arbitration does. Compare APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,

supra note 38, at 17 (stating that 58.7% choose mediation to preserve relationships;
only 41.3% choose arbitration for this reason), with DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 19 (stating that 56% choose mediation to preserve
relationships; 38% choose arbitration for this reason).
247.
Walde, supra note 39, at 3-4; see also Brooker & Layers, supra note 57, at
198-200 (describing new deals and creative solutions arising from domestic commercial
mediations in the UK). Although mediation outcomes can create velvet divorces
through peaceful liquidation of relationships, settlement agreements often produce
renegotiated contracts to help parties create win-win results. INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 12-18. For example, many international intellectual
property disputes begin as rights claims but are resolved as negotiated licensing deals.
Id.; see supra note 244.
Human experience and research shows that negotiators seldom value all
248.
aspects of issues subjected to negotiation in mediation identically. BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 29, at 377, 379-94.
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participants assess their interests. 24 9 This generates "trading," the
most common approach to creating value in dispute resolution, where
disputants exchange that which they value slightly less in return for
These explorations of
that which they value slightly more. 250
interests and priorities encourage business-oriented resolutions such
as apologies, bartered services, bid invitations, expedited delivery
schedules, future price concessions, joint undertakings, licensing
agreements, product discount programs, references, and equipment
use. 251 All of these cognitive-bias-busting actions are made possible
by confidential caucusing, which generates more information from
25 2
which solutions can be fashioned.
B. Overcoming Cultural Barriers
Businesspersons and their lawyers can develop awareness of
their cultural biases and adjust their dispute resolution behaviors

accordingly. 253

Doing this successfully requires reflecting on how

culture affects behaviors 254 and experiencing other cultures over
time 255 and in depth. 256 Business persons and lawyers involved in
transborder commercial dispute resolution should know common
differences generated by collectivist or individualist orientations and

249.
250.

Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 118, at 134.
Id. at 134-35.

251.
E.g., LAWRENCE M. WATSON, INITIATING THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS:
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE,

supra note 118, at 7, 16; Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 118, at 137; Stephen
Schwartz, The Mediated Settlement: Is It Always Just About the Money? Rarely!, 4
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 309, 314 (2004); Younger, supra note 118, at 956.
252.
Bush, supra note 56, at 13. Difficult, challenging, troublesome issues where
emotions run high or zero-sum bargaining is likely to occur are best discussed initially
in private sessions or caucuses. Younger, supra note 118, at 959.
253.
See Barker, supra note 39, at 19-29; Proceedings of the CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution-Spring Meeting, June 1997, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 102, 102 (1997) (arguing that different cultural processes should not be viewed
as impenetrable).
254.
See BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 87 (2000) (arguing that articulating the many different cultural
norms regarding conflict that influence one's behaviors makes it easier to develop
awareness of how one's practices and patterns might differ from others); Bryant, supra
note 184, at 64-67 (suggesting that having lawyers consider similarities and
differences with their clients helps them see how cultural factors may influence
interactions).
See LEDERACH, supra note 3, at 63 (describing the slow, painful process of
255.
developing self-awareness regarding the biases in his mediation training style);
Mediation in Haiti, supra note 183, at 76 (describing cultural learning occurring in a
gradual, evolving process spanning four visits and seventeen workshops in Haiti).
256.
See MAYER, supra note 254, at 87 (noting that it is difficult to acquire
knowledge of cultural influences until experiencing other cultures at deep levels).
Encountering behaviors and beliefs divergent from one's own facilitates recognizing
these differences and thinking about how culturally relativistic common actions are. Id.
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direct or indirect communication preferences. 257 An understanding of
this principle helps them move from believing everyone should
behave like they do to discovering common values and interests
258
despite different orientations, preferences, and behaviors.
Despite their best efforts, skilled negotiators operating under the
influences of their cultural traditions often experience confusion upon
encountering attitudes and behaviors flowing from different
Cultural influences substantially affect how
orientations. 259
disputants perceive, define, explore, and evaluate consequences of
alternatives to adjudication. 260
Identifying, evaluating, and
manipulating interests defeats the fixed-pie bias, 261 and cultural
influences affect how disputants perceive, define, and prioritize their
26 2
needs.
Culturally fluent mediators can identify and correct
miscommunications that prolong resolvable conflicts.
Skilled
transnational dispute mediators are attuned to subtle cultural
patterns and nuances, 263 which allows them to spot signals that

257.
Proceedings of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution-Spring Meeting,
June 1997, supra note 253; see supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
258.
See Proceedings of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution-Spring
Meeting, June 1997, supra note 253. Professor Bryant argues that "knowing ourselves
as cultural beings is the key to being able to identify when we are using biases and
stereotypes, when we are misinterpreting or filling in, and why we are judging people
who are different." Bryant, supra note 184, at 49 n.56. She also suggests that we
should accept that our cultural influences might create "roadblocks to understanding
others," and that as long as we are committed to growth and accept these "blinders that
shape our understanding of others, we can feel less frustrated by setbacks and not
judge ourselves too harshly." Id.
259.
Harold Abramson, The Culturally Suitable Mediator, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK, supra note 68, at 591, 591 (2006).
260.
See JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE
DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 98-

103 (2001); Mediation in Haiti,supra note 183, at 36.
261.
See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text. Mediation typically pushes
"people to move beyond their own focus on what it is they want to a somewhat deeper
consideration of why they want it." MAYER, supra note 254, at 219.
262.
BRETT, supra note 260, at 83-89; Abramson, supra note 259, at 592;
Mediation in Haiti, supra note 183, at 36.
263.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 17. Scholars recommend
learning about relevant cultures and their traditional communication and behavioral
patterns before attempting intercultural dispute resolution. See, e.g., Abramson, supra
note 259, at 592 (suggesting that mediators should be trained and experienced in
helping parties recognize culturally shared interests and surmount culturally based
impasses); Christopher Honeyman & Sandra I. Cheldelin, Have Gavel, Will Travel:
Dispute Resolution Innocents Abroad, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 363, 364 (2002) ("Some
well-meaning people-though genuine experts in a given area-may inadvertently
cause harm to persons and parties for whose culture, language, or circumstances these
professionals' U.S. experience has left them inadequately prepared."); Jan Jung-Min
Sunoo, Some Guidelines for Mediators of Intercultural Disputes, 6 NEG. J. 383, 387
(1990) (suggesting that mediators should make "every effort to learn about the cultural
and social expectations of the persons they will deal with").
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suggest the existence of barriers and misunderstandings. 264 Once
these barriers are spotted, mediators can make sensitive comments
and ask tactful questions to learn what differing expectations and
behaviors mean to disputants. 265 Using this information, mediators
can then translate for disputants in caucuses and bridge these
barriers.266

This method of mediation also separates genuine cultural
impasses from strategic ploys 267 and provides a forum for resolving
barriers that disputants often cannot easily overcome in nonfacilitated negotiation. 26 8 These barriers are usually significant when
they touch elements required to overcome egocentric overconfidence
and fixed-pie, win-lose biases. Co-mediation teams, with neutrals
269
from each cultural tradition, are often effective.

IV. YES, WE

CAN TALK, AND Two IMPORTANT CONVERSATIONS
WE SHOULD HAVE

Business representatives and their lawyers should talk about
how they wish to resolve disputes. 270 Doing this before disputes arise
only makes sense. Research shows that some companies manage
disputes systematically, view conflicts as expected rather than

264.
See Abramson, supra note 259, at 591 (suggesting that disputants from
diverse cultures need a process that helps them recognize and bridge cultural
differences). Mediators should engage with cultural norms as they search for positive
ways to communicate with participants. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at
17.
265.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 17; see also FISHER ET AL.,
supra note 82, at 168 (encouraging negotiators to question their assumptions and check
out these questions when appropriate); Bryant, supra note 184, at 29 (recommending
checking interpretations in cross-cultural situations). Mediation allows exploring
sensitive cultural issues confidentially in caucuses. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 23.
266.
See Abramson, supra note 259, at 594 (observing that skilled mediators
help parties identify the cultural connections to impasses and find ways to resolve
them). Mediators' neutrality allows them to use their more objective perspectives to
identify what is not working between negotiators, and discuss ways to address these
problems and find positive paths forward. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at
17.

267.
See Abramson, supra note 256, at 599 (offering an illustration that
disputants from other countries may have genuine difficulty bringing everyone needed
for their consensus-based decision making process to a mediation, or it may be a
limited authority ploy).
268.
Id. at 591.
269.
Bowen, supra note 9, at 61. The perception of similarity can help establish
trust in the process, even though both neutrals may be equally familiar with nuance
and patterns in both cultures. Id.
270.
See INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 18 (suggesting that an
important first step to using international commercial mediation is explaining and
analyzing options with clients).
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272
unusual occurrences, 271 and develop and follow resolution policies.
Effective dispute management includes helping lawyers understand
business as well as legal issues and using mediation frequently to
pursue interest-based negotiating. 273 Many U.S. corporations have
developed such policies and programs and communicate them to
outside counsel to ensure that work is conducted within their
parameters. 274 Companies who favor mediation when initiating or
defending disputes are more likely to manage disputes effectively
275
than those who always choose adjudication first.
The threshold question of who should decide what dispute
resolution approach to use is answered differently in different
cultures. U.S. business and legal traditions suggest that company
representatives should ultimately decide this question in consultation
with their lawyers. U.S. businesspersons value autonomy 276 and the
power to make final decisions concerning major issues involved in
dispute resolution. 277 U.S. legal ethics standards allocate decisionmaking authority regarding objectives of representation to clients and

271.
See DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 3 (suggesting
that companies recognize that winning may be measured by how well overall total
economic and noneconomic impacts of full array of disputes managed over time);
McEwen, supra note 55, at 14 (noting that managing disputes when regularly involved
in conflicts with customers, suppliers, joint venturers, and competitors is much
different from managing individual disputes). Research also suggests that effective
dispute managing companies are more inclined to adopt a portfolio approach to
handling cases. DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 22.
272.
See id. at 21 (observing that companies that have established dispute
resolving policies are more likely to resolve disputes quicker and at less cost). This
allows companies to identify and change tendencies to choose externally imposed
outcomes to avoid personal responsibilities. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4,
at 116. It also helps businesses change internal economic incentives created by
budgeting systems where agreement costs come from involved departments while
adjudication costs are borne by the entire company. McEwen, supra note 55, at 10-11.
These policies typically identify company objectives in dispute resolution as
"minimizing risk, cost, time and resources expended, and preserve important business
relationships." DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 4.
273.
DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 5-6; McEwen,
supra note 55, at 17.
274.
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting-June 1996, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 98, 98-99 (1996). Motorola, for example, requires

its in-house lawyers to complete an authorization form when the outside counsel
budget in a matter will exceed $50,000. Id. at 99. General Electric includes its
requirements in its outside-counsel guidelines. Id. at 98.
275.
DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 21.
276.
See LEBARON, supra note 182, at 61 (commenting that the United States
demonstrates the prototypical individualistic culture which promotes ideas of the self
as "independent, self-directed, and autonomous").
277.
Involving Business Managers,supra note 44, at 151-52.
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the means by which goals are pursued between them and their
278
lawyers.
Some business traditions, in contrast, allocate disputes not
settled by intercompany negotiation to outside lawyers for
resolution. 279 In these cultural contexts, businesspersons tend to
view such disputes as legal matters to be handled by lawyers without
further company involvement. 280 This might delegate to attorneys
the critical questior of which processes to use.
If consultations regarding dispute resolution mechanisms occur,
they should include the identification and presentation of mediation
as an option, either by lawyers or businesspersons. Most U.S.
attorneys know of mediation as an option to adjudication, even
though fundamental misunderstandings about it exist. 28 1 Research

278.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002). Comment 2 clarifies
this standard for consulting regarding means of accomplishing representational
objectives:
Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with
respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with
respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually
defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.
Id. cmt 2. These traditions usually generate conversations between clients and their
lawyers about options and consequences for resolving individual disputes. U.S. legal
education labels this process "legal counseling." BINDER ET AL., supra note 172, at 2-3.
These interactions may be strongly influenced by existing business policies for
managing dispute resolution. Substantial U.S. research demonstrates the value of
viewing dispute resolution as an aspect of business to be managed thoughtfully rather
than as individual, ad hoc, case-by-case series of decisions. E.g., APPROPRIATE
CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 22-23; DISPUTE-WISE CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 3-4; McEwen, supra note 55, at 24.
Gans, supra note 9, at 52.
279.
Id. This allows short-term avoidance of further involvement by business
280.
personnel while transferring argument primarily to lawyers through adjudication.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 5. Fiat's legal counsel said that its
managers believe disputes belong with lawyers, and that getting involved with conflicts
complicated enough to require attorneys would not be productive. How Mediation is
Practiced in Europe, supra note 229, at 98. Believing they are top negotiators, Fiat
managers assume that if they haven't been able to solve the dispute already, mediation
won't work either. Id.
Most U.S. lawyers originally receive their knowledge about mediation
281.
through experience. Lande, supra note 152, at 169-71. Personal experience with
mediation supplied the major source of information for about two-thirds of the
attorneys and about one-third of the executives surveyed. Id. Notwithstanding the
existence of court-connected mediation programs in many U.S. states for ten to twenty
years, many lawyers fail to differentiate accurately between an adjudicatory process
like arbitration, where neutrals decide, and the consensual process of mediation, where
neutrals help others negotiate but do not make binding substantive decisions. See
Alison Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into Mediation:
Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 846-47 (1998). For
example, the Author once received a call from a lawyer wanting to know where she
could arrange "binding mediation."
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shows that as U.S. businesspersons become more familiar with
mediation, their lawyers usually serve as the primary source of
information. 282 Lack of familiarity with mediation inhibits parties'
28 3
willingness to choose it as a dispute resolution method.
Research suggests that lawyer-client conversations regarding
dispute resolution processes occur on a case-by-case basis rather than
by establishing a general policy. 28 4 A case-by-case focus enhances
decision makers' tendency to emphasize the uniqueness of particular
fact patterns and creates potentially biased outcome predictions. 28 5
Lawyers should counter this tendency by exploring their clients' full
range of interests-including the suitability of mediation for their

282.
Lande, supra note 152, at 169-71.
283.
Involving Business Managers, supra note 44, at 155; see also supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text. As one company representative in the survey of 606
Fortune 1000 companies noted, "[n]ot a lot of people are familiar with mediation, and
it's always a battle to get people to agree to it unless they have been through it before."
APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 27. Problems may
arise concerning knowledge about and understanding of mediation for lawyers and
businesspersons in countries in the Americas where mediation is not well established.
Costa Rican lawyers, for example, have expressed concerns about a general lack of
awareness of mediation and the need to educate judges, attorneys, and companies
about the value of this process. Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note 58, at 11.
Arbitration is the dispute resolution process best understood by disputants on both
sides of the U.S. and Mexican border. Wright, supra note 36, at 57. Mandatory courtconnected mediation, the source of most U.S. lawyers' experience, has been
implemented successfully in a few South American countries. Latin American countries
started viewing mediation as a viable option in the 1990s. Mediation in Latin America,
supra note 16, at 415. Argentina, for example, passed a law in 1995 mandating
mediation before any lawsuit could reach trial, except in family cases. James M.
Cooper, Latin America in the Twenty-First Century: Access to Justice, 30 CAL W. INT'L
L.J. 429, 433 (2000). From April 1996 to April 1997, 69.43% of 29,986 commercial cases
that were mediated reached agreement. Id. Chile has a law requiring a form of
mandatory conciliation in consumer protection matters. Sekolec & Getty, supra note
193, at 178. In addition to Argentina and Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru also
have mediation or conciliation laws. Bowen, supra note 9, at 61-62; Mediation in Latin
America, supra note 16, at 417; Sekolec & Getty, supra note 193, at 178. Narrower
mediation projects have also been implemented in other countries. In Bolivia, for
example, a pilot project used one court as a model for mandatory mediation for the rest
of the country. Anthony Wanis-St. John, Implementing ADR in Transitioning States:
Lessons Learned from Practice, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 369 (2000).
284.
See APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38, at 19
(noting that companies generally make decisions to mediate on a case-by-case basis).
285.
See McEwen, supra note 55, at 13 (observing that one general counsel noted
that his company was pro-mediation in theory "but when you get down to specifics, it's
a hard pill to swallow. We haven't seen many opportunities to use it."). An outside
lawyer noted that "the rhetoric by the inside counsel and the advocacy
of... [mediation] sometimes exceeds what happens when a case comes up;" and, when
confronting the facts of specific disputes, companies are often "tougher on wanting
to ...[adjudicate] than" one might think from reading their policy. CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting-June 1996, supra note 274, at 99. Commercial
conflicts too often generate an automatic "mediation is great in theory but not for this
case" response. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 18; see also supra notes
81, 284 and accompanying text.
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objectives, which involves asking whether fundamental principles are
at stake and whether essential information can be obtained by means
They also include canvassing
other than formal discovery. 28 6
potential benefits of mediation, including how it aids in clarifying
issues, overcomes impasse-causing emotions, provides storytelling
opportunities, realistically examines alternatives to mediated
agreements, and confidentially explores possible trades and creative
28 7
solutions.
Outside lawyers conducting these conversations must balance
the needs to empathize with angry businesspersons and to
demonstrate that they will commit the resources needed to overcome
the outrages their clients have suffered, 288 with a full assessment of
the transaction costs and other disadvantages of adjudication. 28 9 The
cognitive biases discussed earlier and potential conflicting economic
interests may tempt lawyers to use the emotions experienced by
businesspersons to push adjudication rather than encouraging a full
consideration of arbitration's advantages and disadvantages in the
290
best interest of their clients.
Economic concerns might create barriers for outside lawyers to
suggest mediation as a transborder commercial dispute resolution
option. Adjudicating by arbitration is often the only alternative
identified and discussed in U.S. settings29 1 and other traditions
where lawyers exercise more decision making authority. 292 U.S.

SCANLON, supra note 45, at 1.10. Unfamiliar business clients need to
286.
understand how mediation's opportunities to give and receive information
confidentially to and from impartial neutrals, who will then use it to assist negotiation,
differ from nonmediated negotiations, where no opportunities exist to counter spiraling
mistrust. Proceedings from the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution-Winter Meeting,
January 1997, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 59, 61 (1997).

287.
SCANLON, supra note 45, at 1.10-1.11. Other concerns include: (1) the
nature of business relationships making preservation or amicable divorce desirable; (2)
assuring executives that settlement receives its best shot before adjudicating; and (3)
the desire to fully explore creative, non-legal, business-created solutions.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 22.

288.
Dealing with FinancialDisincentives to ADR, supra note 86, at 45. Outside
lawyers understand that they often must provide this type of reassurance to secure
engagement for the representation. Id.
See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
289.
290.
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 167 (noting that attorneys
sometimes add fuel to their clients' emotional fires to encourage adjudicatory choices).
291.
A survey of 2,300 Ohio lawyers showed that even attorneys favoring
mediation often do not refer a significant portion of their clients to mediation. Rogers &
McEwen, supra note 147, at 841. Although most Ohio lawyers surveyed favored
expanded use of mediation, only a tenth regularly recommended the process to their
clients. Id.
When asked why they don't use mediation more often, 68% of twenty-five
292.
Italian companies surveyed said it was because their outside counsel had not identified
it as an option. How Business Conflict Resolution Is Being Practiced in China and
Europe, supra note 162, at 149.
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corporate personnel complain that their lawyers fail to present
293
mediation as an option.
U.S. business personnel express concern that their lawyers do
not mention or counsel them fully about mediation because they fear
that doing so will diminish their income. 294 For U.S. companies,
much of the cost of commercial disputes comes from paying outside
lawyers to handle arbitration or litigation. 295 Most U.S. law firms

293.
See CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting-June 1996, supra
note 274, at 98 (describing that, in seventy lawsuits in the preceding year, outside
counsel had not mentioned mediation as an option). Scholars argue that properly
interpreting legal ethics rules obligates U.S. lawyers to counsel clients regarding
mediation and other alternatives to adjudication. WATSON, supra note 251, at 10; see
also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 167-68 (1999) (setting out proper attorney
conduct, including informing clients of dispute resolution options and discussing all
proposed dispute resolution agreements); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The
Many "Cs" of Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 979, 981 (2001) ("Every lawyer ought to have an ethical obligation to counsel
clients about the multiple ways of resolving problems and planning transactions.").
Several U.S. states require attorneys to discuss mediation with their clients by ethics
rules, court rules, and statutes. See Rogers & McEwen, supra note 147, at 862
(discussing U.S. states that require attorneys to discuss mediation with their clients by
ethics rules, court rules, and statutes). Although no American Bar Association Model
Rule of Professional Conduct applies directly, provisions of this code obligate lawyers to
offer legal explanations that are reasonably necessary to permit clients to make
informed decisions, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2007), and to make
reasonable effort to expedite dispute resolution consistent with client interests. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (requiring "reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client"). Other scholars contend that
these ethical rules, and the growing use of institutionalized, court-connected mediation,
impose a duty to counsel clients about mediation as a best practice measure. E.g.,
WATSON, supra note 251, at 10; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professional Rules and ADR:
Control of Alternative Dispute Resolution under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
Proposaland Other ProfessionalResponsibility Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895,
897 (2001); Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an Attorney Face DisciplinaryActions or Even
Malpractice Liability for Failure to Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute Resolution?,
27 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 809 (1997). The Litigation Section Task Force on Ethical
Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations has concluded that lawyers have a duty to
advise clients promptly of adjudicatory alternatives after retention in a dispute.
WATSON, supra note 251, at 10. U.S. proponents of client-centered counseling
recommend that lawyers provide their clients with reasonable opportunities to consider
alternatives that "similarly-situated clients" would likely find important. BINDER ET
AL., supra note 172, at 332-33. Mediation qualifies as a realistic alternative that most
business representatives are likely to find useful to assess, particularly in contexts
where these clients have neither knowledge about nor experience with facilitated
negotiation. See id. at 284, 333 (naming mediation as a potential solution to litigation
problems, and emphasizing the importance of suggesting such alternatives).
294.
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting-June 1996, supra
note 274, at 98.
295.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 16, at 50-51 (arguing that commercial
disputes represent profitable activity for the almost obligatory use of outside lawyers
who serve businesses confronted with the challenges involved in transborder
arbitration); Donald Lee Rome, Writing Rules: Eliminate the Boilerplate, and Draft
According to the Terms of the Deal, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 159, 160
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who do this work charge for their services by billing their time at an
hourly rate. 296 This fee arrangement motivates lawyers to devote the
time needed to achieve the best results for clients and is particularly
useful when it is not clear initially how much time matters will
require. 297 However, hourly billing lessens the connection between
the benefits of representation to clients and the amount clients
pay. 298 This disconnect tempts some lawyers to do unnecessary work
to earn more fees. 299 Research suggests that more than three-fourths
of U.S. in-house lawyers feel that hourly billing influences how much
time outside lawyers spend on cases and significantly decreases
300
incentives to work efficiently.
Use of an adjudicatory process like arbitration requires lawyers
to identify and follow applicable procedures, develop legal theories
supporting remedies and defenses that pursue client objectives, draft
submissions and responses, gather and present evidence, and create
and assert arguments. 30 1 These are tasks in line with lawyers'
education and experience. 30 2 Applying the assumption that what one

(December 1997) (observing that litigators, not business lawyers, dominate the
arbitration process). See generally Analyzing Company ADR Systems Practices,supra
note 236, at 54 (reporting that in 1999 General Electric spent 44% of the company's
total outside legal expenditures on adjudication).
296.
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 170 (2000). Commercial disputes are a lucrative market for lawyers.
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 16, at 118; see also MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 83
(arguing that hourly billing is used most often by deal-making attorneys and defense
counsel in litigation).
297.
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 83.
298.
Id. at 83-84.
299.
Id. at 84; see also RHODE, supra note 296, at 170 ("If lawyers are charging
by the hour and lack other equally profitable uses for their time, they have an incentive
to string out projects for as long as possible."). General research, not limited to business
representation, on U.S. lawyers' hourly billing practices is not encouraging. Less than
5% of U.S. residents believe "that they get good value for the price of legal services." Id.
at 168. Auditors have found demonstrable billing fraud in 5%-10% of reviewed bills,
and questionable practices in another 25%-30% of receipts they analyzed. Id. at 179.
Research suggests that 40% of U.S. lawyers confirm that "some of their work is
influenced by a desire to bill additional hours." Id.
300.
Of the interviewed in-house attorneys, 80% felt that the billable hour
influenced how much time outside lawyers spent on a case, and 74% felt it decreased
incentives to work efficiently. RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL
COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 83-84 (1999). Professor Rhode notes that surveys
suggest "about half of in-house counsel and chief executives believe that their law firms
are overbilling." RHODE, supra note 296, at 169; see also William G. Ross, The Ethics of
Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (discussing criticisms that
hourly billing encourages inefficiency).
301.
See Brooker & Lavers, supra note 57, at 162 (stating that the legal
profession in the UK, anxious to maintain its monopoly in dispute resolution work, has
assimilated arbitration into the formal system).
302.
Lawyers need to perform different tasks and understand business interests
to help clients mediate transborder commercial disputes effectively. See Cronin-Harris,
supra note 111, at 861 (stating that lawyers have been asked to use flexible procedures
focusing on business as well as legal issues). Lawyers need to pursue interest-based as
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gets paid for strongly influences what one recommends, U.S.
businesspersons assert that hourly billing provides lawyers a
disincentive to mediate 30 3 and creates economic conflicts of interest
between them and their lawyers. 30 4 Some contend that hourly billing
practices are the primary reason mediation is not used more in
30 5
commercial disputes.
U.S. lawyers dispute these views and contend that, while they
invariably mention mediation, their clients want adjudication most of
the time. 30 6 They view the claim that hourly billing practices
influence outside
lawyers not to mention or recommend mediation as
"outrageous."30 7 In one study, 51% of outside counsel agreed that a
substantial increase in the proportion of mediated disputes by their

well as positional negotiating strategies. Id. Attorneys trained in advocacy using strict
rules of procedure often resist using flexible approaches encompassing a wide array of
business as well as legal issues and strategic concerns. Id. Mediating also generates
more client participation and outcome control, and replaces lawyer-dominated
advocacy and zero-sum outcomes in adjudication with consensus agreements. Id.
303.
See McEwen, supra note 55, at 11 (reporting that a general counsel's
statements that "[t]he hourly billing rate is the villain" blocking efforts to settle early
and inexpensively, that hourly billing makes it "in the best interests of lawyers to do
things slowly," and that the concept of early settlement "strikes fear throughout the
entire body of a private law firm lawyer").
304.
Id. In-house attorneys express disappointment with the apparent
reluctance of law firms to put their clients' bottom line ahead of firm economics. CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting-June 1996, supra note 274, at 98. A
former general counsel at a large company noted that no law firms, as a matter of
policy, ask their lawyers to bill as few hours as possible, but rather repeat the "keep
the billable hours up" mantra so often that it becomes background noise. Dealing With
FinancialDisincentives to ADR, supra note 86, at 45. Much of this criticism comes from
lawyers working inside companies who seek but do not receive support from outside
lawyers for their efforts to promote mediation. Lande, supra note 152, at 182. A general
counsel for a U.S. company, for example, noted that:
It's always difficult getting attorneys to make a move that they think might
lose them some advantage. That may be more the case if you're dealing with
outside attorneys ... where you have perhaps more of a feeling that you're
making a determination strictly on a legal basis and your duty to vigorously
defend your client.
Id.
305.
See, e.g., Business Mediation, from All Points of View, supra note 119, at
104 (presenting the opinion of an attorney that fee issues limit mediation use). A
partner at a Philadelphia law firm who heads its ADR group blamed fee issues for
limiting mediation use, saying "I think it is the law firms who are not running with
this whole idea of mediation." Id.
306.
See Dealing with Financial Disincentives to ADR, supra note 86, at 48
(reporting the comments of a partner and a former managing partner of a Philadelphia
law firm and former chair of the ABA litigation section). Some lawyers estimate that
their dispute resolution conversations with clients produce a mediation flunk rate of
90%. CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting-June 1996, supra note 274,
at 98.
307.
Dealing with Financial Disincentives to ADR, supra note 86, at 48. One
prominent lawyer stated that "private law firms are not steering from or avoiding
recommending ADR because they are trying to accumulate hours." Id.
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firm or a major business client would not affect their personal
compensation.3 0 8 This survey also reported that 25% of outside
counsel believed that an increase in the percentage of mediated
30 9
matters would decrease their personal compensation.
Mediation does not necessarily diminish law firm revenues.
Billing for time spent helping clients prepare for and participate in
mediations lessens adverse economic effects. 310
Refraining shortterm fee loss as long-term gains from enhanced reputations and
increased referral and repeat business also eases concerns about
311
diminished income from increased mediation.
Lawyers and their clients should have a second important
conversation about creating contract provisions ex ante that require

mediation before resorting to arbitral or judicial adjudication. Using
a stepped approach of mediation first and, if not successful, then
arbitration, provides opportunities to seek business-oriented solutions
not constrained by conventional legal frameworks before spending
time and money on adversarial, arbitral adjudication. 3 12 Stepped

308.
Lande, supra note 152, at 179-80. The percentages agreeing with this
proposition in this study were much higher for executives (79%) and inside counsel
(78%). Id. at 180.
309.
Id. Almost none of the inside counsel or executives surveyed expressed this
concern. Id. Most of the outside counsel expected only a small decline in personal
compensation. Id.
310.
See Brooker & Layers, supra note 57, at 190 (discussing findings that a
large percentage of lawyers are satisfied with the cost of mediation, and that clients
consider savings in legal costs when selecting the process). Large commercial
mediations will inevitably involve plenty of billable hours for lawyers. See id. at 185
(arguing that representation will be employed for the negotiation process and the
mediation itself). Preparation is essential to make international commercial mediation
successful. See INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 116-17 (identifying the
lack of preparation as an obstacle to successful mediation). Lawyers are also needed to
help disputants compare agreement options to likely adjudication outcomes. See
Brooker & Layers, supra note 57, at 185 (stating that people use the likely outcome of a
court decision to guide negotiations).
311.
See Lande, supra note 152, at 182-83. As one outside counsel in Professor
Lande's study noted:
[If] I suggested ADR and as a result we settled the case without spending gobs
of money on lawyers, I suppose it could have a negative effect on my
compensation in the sense that there's been less legal work generated and so
less fees generated and therefore less income. On the other hand, if you get a
good result and you have a happy client and the word gets out, long-term
maybe that ends up being to your benefit because you'll have more business
coming in because you've gotten a good economical result for the client.
Id. A good way to generate substantial legal business is to have "lots of clients come
back to you time and again." Dealing with FinancialDisincentives to ADR, supra note
86, at 48; see also How Mediation is Practiced in Europe, supra note 229, at 99 (noting
that companies want lawyers looking at the long term, not short term, and seeking best
results, especially if it means less litigation).
312.
SCANLON, supra note 45, at 1.5. In some ways, this stepped approach
parallels the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade Organization.
Maraia Alejandra Rodriguez Lemmo, Study of Selected International Dispute
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clauses typically provide that, upon notice of a claim arising from the
contract between the parties, authorized representatives agree to
mediate 313 in a specified way, 314 using specified neutrals, 3 15 within a
certain period of time. 316 If mediation fails to resolve the dispute
fully, the parties then agree to arbitrate with specifications for time,
place, and other arbitral procedures. 317 Arranging arbitration as a
fallback if all issues cannot be resolved at mediation provides an
adjudication shadow that helps parties to act more reasonably when

Resolution Regimes, with an Analysis of the Decisions of the Court of Justice of the
Andean Community, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 863, 864-65 (2002). This process
begins with consultations following strict time guidelines and if these negotiations fail,
then arbitration occurs. Id. Parties may agree to use other processes like mediation,
conciliation, and good offices at any time. Id. at 865. NAFTA and CAFTA provisions
also incorporate this approach. See infra note 354.
313.
Giving special attention to the definition of mediation makes sense to
mitigate cultural misunderstandings. Abramson, supra note 9, at 325; see supra notes
191-96 and accompanying text. It is essential that all participants understand the
mediation process and its objectives. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 116.
The potential for crippling misunderstandings is probably diminishing as international
norms of dispute resolution evolve and more companies and lawyers experience
mediation or conciliation as the same nonbinding, often facilitative and occasionally
evaluative, assisted negotiation. Abramson, supra note 9, at 325-26.
314.
Selecting, adapting, and designating an "off the shelf set of mediation
rules" is recommended. Abramson, supra note 9, at 326. This permits designing a
focused process that serves the needs of parties. Id. Starting from scratch requires
substantial time, effort, and expense, and many organizations have mechanisms in
place that can easily be adapted. Id. at 324, 326. These organizations include the
American Arbitration Association, the Center for Public Resources, and the
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center of the Americas. Id. at 324. Each offers
procedures that provide useful ground rules encompassing selecting mediators,
structuring the mediation process, and gaining administrative support for conducting
mediations. Id.; SCANLON, supra note 45, at 2.16-2.17.
315.
Mediator selection is extremely important because mediators vary
substantially in experience, relevant knowledge, and preferred approach. COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 15. Agreeing on the mediator or mediators
and the precise process in advance avoids delays that quarrels about these issues can
generate. See Abramson, supra note 9, at 26 (suggesting obligation clauses, time
tables, and clear procedures for selecting a mediator). Advance designation of
mediators allows them to help resolve problems when controversies first arise, before
they ripen into disputes and conflicts. See Gans, supra note 9, at 54 (arguing in favor of
the early selection of a neutral party). Most organizations' rules include provisions on
mediator selection. SCANLON, supra note 45, at 2.18. CPR, for example, provides that if
parties cannot promptly agree on a mediator, they will notify CPR of their need for
assistance. Id. Choosing mediators that are trained to deal with cultural differences
and use approaches that fit the cultural needs of the parties helps ensure that these
barriers to agreement are successfully traversed. Abramson, supra note 259, at 591-93;
supranotes 263-69 and accompanying text.
316.
Phillips, supra note 159, at 8. Definite time frames accomplish
management efficiency objectives. SCANLON, supra note 45, at 2.17. They also dampen
inclinations reluctant parties might have once disputes arise either to avoid mediating
or to use the process to delay adjudication in bad faith. Abramson, supra note 9, at 326.
317.
See SCANLON, supra note 45, at 2.16 (providing a sample two-step
mediation and arbitration clause).
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mediating and gives them alternative outcome predictions to consider
3 18
in evaluating agreement options.
The difficulty in securing an agreement to mediate causes many
businesses to use adjudication. 319 Contracting for a two-step dispute
resolution mechanism of mediation first, then arbitration, before
disputes arise avoids significant obstacles to agreeing on a dispute
resolution mechanism after a conflict has begun.3 20 Creating this
contractual obligation commits companies to mediation and prevents
a single disputant from vetoing use of this potentially valuable
321
process.
U.S. courts generally conclude that predispute agreements to
mediate are enforceable.3 22 Predispute agreements obligate parties
only to sit down together to discuss the dispute-they do not require
them to reach agreement.3 23 Frequently, these discussions either

318.
See Keith L. Seat, What Every Antitrust Lawyer Should Know About
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Presentation at the ABA Administrative Law
Conference 4 (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://keithseat.com/documents/WhatEvery
AntitrustLawyerShouldKnowAboutADR.pdf ("The benefits of both mediation and
arbitration can be obtained by mediating first and then using binding arbitration to
resolve any outstanding issues."); see also Abramson, supra note 9, at 327 ('When
arbitration is the backup, settlement agreements that result can be incorporated into a
'consent arbitration award' which can then be enforced under the relatively reliable
New York Convention ....").Presumably this will also work in Latin America under
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, which is
similar to the New York Convention in many respects. de Araujo, supra note 18, at 51.
319.
APPROPRIATE CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 38 at 24. The
unwillingness of opposing parties to agree to mediate was the principal reason
companies did not use mediation and was identified as a barrier to mediation use by
three-quarters of 606 companies surveyed. Id. at 26.
320.
See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 9, at 324 (observing that parties are usually
not in the mood to think about dispute resolution creatively when deals go sour); Gans,
supra note 9, at 54 (discussing that early selection of a neutral party is best before
suspicion sets in after conflicts arise); Phillips, supra note 159, at 8 (discussing the
understanding that few disputants would agree to mediate if the suggestion was made
after disputes arose).
321.
But see Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 61, at 100 (emphasizing that if
one participant has a preference for something other than mediation, such as litigation,
the preference prevails).
322.
Kathleen M. Scanlon & Adam Spiewak, Enforcement of Contract Clauses
Providingfor Mediation, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 1 (2001); see also
Semco LLC v. Ellicott Mach. Corp. Int'l, No. 99-1928, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10710, at
*1 (E.D. La. July 9, 1999) (granting preliminary injunction preventing premature
invocation of arbitration contrary to contract term requiring mediation first). Specific
enforcement and contract damages have been allowed. Scanlon & Spiewak, supra, at 1.
In the mid-1990s, members of the Brazilian Supreme Court disagreed about whether
agreements to arbitrate future disputes could be specifically enforced. de Araujo, supra
note 18, at 52-53. One Minister advanced "the dubious theory" that enforcing such
clauses violated "the right to access to justice." Id. at 53.
323.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 14.
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resolve some or all of the disputed issues, or they allow efficient
324
design of subsequent arbitration.
Businesses and their lawyers often spend little or no time during
the negotiation phase discussing how they will handle disputes after
a transborder deal takes effect. 3 25 Several common negotiation
dynamics militate against negotiating stepped mediation- arbitration
clauses in transborder commercial contracts. These include time
constraints and the desire to close deals as soon as economic issues,
3 26
transaction terms, and other relevant conditions are completed.
Dispute resolution clauses are sometimes called "midnight
clauses" because negotiators leave them until then end, and then, late
at night or early in the morning, simply use boilerplate arbitration
language. 32 7
Negotiating thoughtful stepped dispute resolution
This might influence some
clauses takes time and money. 328
businesspersons and lawyers to view boilerplate arbitration clauses
as default, status quo terms, triggering a cognitive bias in favor of the
329
traditional over the alternatives.

324.
Id.; see also Barker, supra note 39, at 10 (stating that mediation allows
parties to structure the framework for future negotiations); Brooker & Lavers, supra
note 57, at 200 (citing a solicitor's experience that mediation narrowed the issues for
trial); Younger, supra note 118, at 960 (arguing that mediation can narrow the issues
for the parties). Process design decisions that can result include facilitating
information exchange and selecting arbitrators. Brooker & Lavers, supra note 57, at
200. Pre-adjudication mediation has been described as a risk-free process. Involving
Business Managers,supra note 44, at 154.
325.

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 6; see also Gans,

supra note 9, at 52 (noting that companies rarely provide for dispute resolution
provisions); Phillips, supra note 159, at 8 ("[T]oo few contracts include stepped
clauses.").
326.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 6. The desire to
close deals sometimes discourages using stepped dispute resolution clauses because the
time it takes to negotiate them delays closure on the deal. Involving Business
Managers, supra note 44, at 158.
327.
Phillips, supra note 159, at 8. Dispute resolution clauses are often viewed
by lawyers and their clients as boilerplate provisions. Rome, supra note 295, at 159.
Typical dispute resolution clauses are boilerplate constructions that often turn out to
be totally unsatisfactory for many businesses and commercial contracts. Id.
328.
See Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 61, at 93 (observing that
transaction costs are disincentives to contracting). Using a stepped dispute resolution
clause rather than a default, boilerplate arbitration provision involves transaction
costs associated with considering additional options, negotiating, and drafting. Id.
329.
Id. As one scholar has noted, "because the standard arbitration clause is so
simple, straightforward, and well-known," lawyers and business representatives are
reluctant to deviate from it. Carbonneau, supra note 48, at 1202-03. This bias is
partially explained by tendencies to see defaults as entitlements from which it is
difficult to depart. Id.; see also Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation, supra
note 124, at 1585 (arguing that parties are less likely to bargain around default
contracts than might be expected because they may think of default terms like
entitlements). A related influence is a general preference for inaction over action. Id. at
1586.
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Relationship concerns often inhibit the negotiation of stepped
dispute resolution clauses.
Businesspersons and lawyers often
experience reluctance to introduce what might be perceived as

negative

perspectives

into

discussions

with

their

prospective

partners. 330 Businesspersons and lawyers might also suffer from an
optimistically overconfident expectation that no serious disputes will
arise. 331 The conscientious lawyer's insistence that perfect contracts
do not exist and that the best time to realize the benefits of avoiding
adjudication is before disputes arise counters this bias.3 32 The best
time to plan effective dispute resolution is when parties share good

will and high hopes.33 3 A tactful expression of concern for the future
of the business relationship often disarms parties hesitant to discuss
3 34
dispute resolution when commencing a relationship.
Negotiating an agreement to mediate after disputes arise, while
possible, 335 is difficult.
These requests often confront another
cognitive bias, a negative reaction stimulated by the adversarial
relationship that exists in a dispute.3 3 6 Called "reactive devaluation,"
this cognitive bias suggests that evaluations of proposals in dispute
resolution change depending on their source. 33 7 Proposals to mediate
might generate this response, particularly from disputants unfamiliar
with neutral-assisted negotiation. 33 8 Unfamiliarity with mediation
makes the adversary's intentions for proposing it difficult to discern,
33 9
and this reinforces tendencies to devalue and reject it.
U.S. businesspersons and lawyers may encounter additional
difficulties in proposing mediation after disputes arise.
U.S.
processes and procedures are disfavored and feared in many countries

330.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 6.
331.
See id. ("New business partners often have overly optimistic expectations
for their relationship."); see also supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
332.
See Phillips, supra note 159, at 8 (stating that disputants had to be
reminded that there are no perfect contracts, and that it is best to arrange the process
earlier rather than later).
333.
See Abramson, supra note 9, at 324 (stating that the best time to discuss
dispute resolution is when the parties are negotiating the business deal because the
parties are optimistic); Gans, supra note 9, at 52 (arguing that the time to deal with
potential conflict is during negotiations, when there is mutual good will and hopes are
high).

334.

Involving Business Managers,supra note 44, at 159.

335.
See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 17 ("If the
parties have not included a provision calling for mediation of disputes in their business
agreement, they may agree to mediate after a dispute has arisen.").
336.
See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 165 ("[A] party may devalue a
proposal received from someone perceived as an adversary, even if the identical offer
would have been acceptable when suggested by a neutral or an ally.").
337.
Id.
338.
See Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 61, at 97 ("One of the important
factors behind reactive devaluation is the lack of knowledge about the actual intentions
of an adversary and, consequently a lack of knowledge the intentions behind an offer.").
339.
Id.
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of the world. 340 Mediation's use of neutral-assisted negotiation is
much more common in U.S. domestic disputes than elsewhere in the
Americas, 34 1 and this makes it easier to perceive mediation as a U.S.specific process.
In addition, many countries in the Americas have resisted efforts
to import U.S. ideas about mediation without change. 34 2 U.S. parties
suggesting mediation must avoid implying that their domestic
approaches to and experiences with this process are the right ways to
think and act. 343 Substantial evidence suggests that U.S. models of
conflict resolution are based on assumptions that do not coincide with
the cultural traditions and behavioral influences of Latin Americans
to whom they are presented. 344 For example, one of the Chamber of
Commerce-initiated commercial mediation centers developed in
Bolivia objected to "the Harvard model" of dispute resolution because
it did not directly transfer to Bolivian commercial expectations and
experiences. 345 Negotiators facing these and other challenges might
seek the intervention of an independent third party to suggest
mediation to all disputants. 346 Sometimes arbitrators perform this
34 7
role.

V. CONCLUSION

Mediation is not, by itself, a panacea for resolving transborder
commercial disputes. Mediation is a simply a process tool, and its
value ultimately depends on how businesses and their lawyers use

340.
March 1998 CPR Winter Meeting Supplement, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 45, 47 (1998).
341.
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 58 (observing that the United States
leads other countries in its frequency of mediation use).
342.
See Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note 58, at 26-27 (arguing that
American efforts to export methods without change is offensive to Latin American
nations, and that some Latin Americans have argued that American methods are not
directly adaptable to their situations).
343.
LEDERACH, supra note 3, at 38; see also Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note
58, at 26 (warning that Latin Americans do not appreciate the U.S. models of conflict
resolution).
344.
Mediation in Costa Rica, supra note 58, at 26; see also LEDERACH, supra
note 3 at 51. U.S. mediation models are not uniformly accepted in Latin America.
Wright, supranote 36, at 61.
345.
Wanis-St. John, supra note 283, at 354-55.
346.
COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 18.
347.
Id. Rule 18 of the CPR Arbitration Rules, for example, provides that "[w]ith
the consent of the parties, the Tribunal at any stage of proceedings may arrange for
mediation . . . by a mediator acceptable to the parties." Id. (quoting CPR INST. FOR
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION, R. 18.2).
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it. 348 When used appropriately 349 as an opportunity to embrace
interest-based negotiation that seeks the best outcomes for parties
willing to avoid the additional time, expense, and uncertainty of
arbitrating, 350 mediation often produces relatively quick and
35 1
inexpensive solutions that honor businesses' needs and concerns.
Regional trade agreements typically neither prohibit nor
particularly encourage mediation. NAFTA, for example, does not
specifically authorize alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
(ADR) except in cases of disputes about the interpretation and
application of NAFTA and in investment disputes. 352 NAFTA and
CAFTA encourage the use of arbitration and other means of ADR for
the settlement of international commercial disputes. 353
Their
provisions do not mention mediation specifically except where they
list processes their commissions might use after party negotiations
fail. 354 Failure to mention mediation more prominently affirms these
355
trade regimes' prevailing bias in favor of arbitral adjudication.
Exposure through trade regimes to countries with well-developed
mediation systems has helped other nations learn the value of

348.
McEwen, supra note 55, at 3; see also INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 7 (observing that mediation on its own cannot overcome "irreconcilable
differences" between parties in the global community).
349.
Some express concern that, in the international area, parties represented
by counsel have frequently used mediation merely for strategic advantage.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 15, at 324; see also Brooker &
Lavers, supra note 57, at 203-11 (describing inappropriate uses of mediation in the
United Kingdom); Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 118, at 134-37 (estimating
attorneys' lies about interests and priorities in U.S. mediation). This manipulation of
mediation stems from adversarial thinking and from fixed-pie and zero-sum cognitive
biases. One survey showed that win-lose thinking strongly influences reasons lawyers
give for not choosing mediation, including factors such as fear of disclosing strategy
and conveying weakness. CPR Meeting Survey Finds Mediation Is Top ADR Choice,
supranote 32, at 98.
350.
See WATSON, supra note 251, at 15 (noting that the ultimate goal of
mediation is to put parties in position to make the best meaningful choice between
accepting best settlement option available and initiating or continuing adjudication).
351.
Cf. Gans, supra note 9, at 53 (stating that legal remedies are often too
draconian, and suing someone rarely serves business goals).
352.
Freese & Spagnola, supra note 20, at 61.
353.
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 58 (arguing that the language of
NAFTA encourages resolution and places focus on arbitration); Luis M. Martinez, U.S.
Signs CAFTA, DIsP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1, 2004, at 9, 9 (asserting that CAFTA provides for
a dispute resolution process that includes arbitration).
354.
See Central America-Dom. Rep.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement art. 20.5, Aug.
5, 2004, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 43 I.L.M. 514 (recognizing the steps the Commission may take
to assist the parties to reach a "mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute"); North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2007, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M
289 (1993) (stating that the Commission may have resources to good offices,
conciliation, and mediation).
355.
See Anderson, supra note 9, at 58 (arguing that mediation must be
promoted to overcome barriers such as cultural ignorance).
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assisted negotiation. 356 Adding mediation provisions to international
treaties in the Americas might encourage the development of
mediation processes in Latin American countries where it is not yet
well established.3 57 While the Mercosul integration treaties make no
mention of mediation or conciliation specifically, 35 8 they allow
aggrieved parties to participate in assisted-negotiation mechanisms
before arbitration. 359 This communicates that mediation is a serious
option. 360 Commentators have noted how helpful it would be to have
NAFTA, CAFTA, Mercosul, and other regional trade bodies adopt
provisions endorsing stepped dispute resolution that begins with
36 1
mediation.
As this Article has argued, disputants face substantial cognitive,
cultural, and sometimes conflicting economic interest-based barriers
when they choose an appropriate process to resolve transborder
commercial disputes. Adversarial business and legal culture, along
with the difficulties many businesses and their lawyers experience in
changing routines and traditional expectations, combine to generate a
default resort to adjudication. Tradition, rather than purposeful
choice, appears to dictate excessive reliance on arbitration even as
mediation has emerged as a useful commercial dispute resolution
process.
This decision to arbitrate rather than mediate, like many others
negotiators make, often seems suboptimal in hindsight. 362 This
Article suggests several strategies for making the often optimal
choice to mediate before adjudicating. If parties to transborder
commercial disputes are serious about achieving resolutions that best
effectuate their interests, it is essential that these parties-and their
lawyers-acknowledge and overcome the cognitive and cultural
barriers that persistently push them toward adjudication.

356.
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 427. Mercosul exposed
Brazilian companies to corporations in Argentina who have extensive experience with
domestic mediation of commercial disputes. Id. Similarly, Mexican companies can learn
from interactions with U.S. corporations through NAFTA. Id. These interactions have
also helped mediation organizations form in Brazil and Mexico. Id.
357. Id.
358.
de Araujo, supra note 18, at 26-27, 36 (noting that the dispute resolution in
Mercosul does not mention mediation or conciliation, although private disputants can
participate through consultations with Mercosul's trade commission).
359.
Mediation in Latin America, supra note 16, at 432; Brazilia Protocol for the
Settlement of Disputes arts. 2-3, 25, Mar. 26, 1991, 36 I.L.M. 691.
360.
See generally GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that
the globalization and regionalization of trade law is stimulating new interest in
mediation.).
361.
See Anderson, supra note 9, at 63 (urging NAFTA to endorse mediation).
Further reforms of regional trading bloc procedures are needed to trigger greater use of
mediation to meet the needs of international trade. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra
note 4, at 13.
362.
See Adler, supra note 67, at 773 (proposing that in hindsight, any deal one
negotiates may seem sub-optimal).

